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IV

The ethnography is divided into three parts. In the first part, after providing a brief general sketch of Orokaiva culture, I shall examine the 'starting mechanisms' of Orokaiva exchange cycles, both in traditional institutions (Ch. III) and in institutions developed since the British-Australian conquest (Ch. IV). The second part of the study is concerned chiefly with objects of mediation: land, taro, pigs, minor foods and ornaments (Chs. V–IX). In the third part the focus shifts to the relations between exchange partners mediated by the prestations analysed in the preceding chapters.

Although my presentation of Orokaiva social structure in this part of the work is not intended to be controversial, the focus differs from that of earlier ethnographies and here and there earlier findings had to be questioned in the light of fresh evidence. Orokaiva society contains several types of groupings (clan, local clan group, lineage, plant emblem group) whose members, according to informants, are recruited exclusively on the basis of agnatic descent. Earlier investigators have emphasised these patrilineal characteristics by equating the lineage and clan emblem group, proclaiming them both to be segments of local clan groups, and by treating the local clan group as something like a segment of a clan. My own analysis, however, will be concerned more with clan fusions and fissions, with irregular recruitment within the plant emblem group, and with the lack of evidence for agnatic connection between lineages and local clan groups. My evidence shows that the non-agnates recruited into these putatively agnatic groupings are mostly uterine kin. But above all I shall try to establish that these departures from the supposed agnatic norms are not cases of irregularity or deviance, but an integral part of the Orokaiva kinship system. I shall suggest that normally clans are not intrinsically agnatic but rather that they arose out of alliances between smaller groups whose original link was affinal. The effect of this argument is to show the narrow limits of range and scope within which Orokaiva patrilineal corporations operate, and thus to emphasise the importance of the exchange system as a principle of social structure.

As soon as we extend kinship analysis beyond the conjugal family, we observe that mediation is carried on not only through non-social objects used as gifts or prestations, but also through social objects used as intermediaries. Thus, in the relation between sister's son and mother's brother there is an intermediary who is mother of one of the partners and sister of the other. Similarly, the relation between two brothers-in-law is mediated by a woman who is wife of one and sister of the other. Men also often act as mediators between exchange partners when these are not linked by kinship, or when the exchange partners are female.

The principles of exchange are the same whether the objects of meditation be social or non-social. In both cases there are two partners, *ego* and *alter*, who establish or maintain a social relationship. The object of mediation, whether social or non-social, is so chosen that both *ego* and *alter* are – or become – closely identified with it. If *ego* and *alter* are male non-agnatic kinsmen, the mediator must be a woman· if they are female non-agnatic kinsmen, the mediator must be a man. In either case, the concept of an object of mediation implies that at the beginning of the transaction *ego* had some exclusive claim

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upon the man or woman who is being 'transferred', but as the result of the transaction this claims passes to *alter*.

The most familiar example of such a transfer is that of a woman who is 'given' by her brother to her prospective husband. When Lévi-Strauss developed the exchange or 'alliance' theory of social structure, he mainly discussed this type of transaction, whereby a social relationship between two male partners is created by the transfer of a woman from the control of one to the other. It is clear, however, that for every man who marries, a new relationship is also created between women who become sisters-in-law. In a very significant sense, the wife has taken the man from the sister. The Orokaiva acknowledge this aspect in two ways: by the gift of a pig made by the wife to the sister, and by the term of address *bi* (= penis) used between sisters-in-law.

We may thus see social structure as the product of a web of mediation. The usefulness of such a concept depends very much on the extent to which these intermediaries are institutionally involved in dealings between partners. Among the Orokaiva, their roles as intermediaries in exchanges between men are well articulated. As wives, as sisters and as mothers they link the very small patrilineal kinship groups into social units of a viable size. The system of marriage is a rather involved one, containing elements of restricted as well as of complex generalised exchange. Once this system of marriage is fully understood (Ch. X), the basic workings of Orokaiva society stand fairly clearly revealed. The study of Orokaiva exchange would not be adequate, however, without a brief consideration of the independent friendship network and the system of ranking, especially as it has affected recent Orokaiva-Australian relations (Ch. XI).

We thus return, though with a slightly more specific methodology, to Mauss' concept of exchange as a 'total phenomenon', in the sense that we posit the interrelations of notions of exchange occurring at any level of conceptualisation, social and non-social. It is in the very pervasiveness of such notions throughout the culture that we find evidence for its dominance in Orokaiva thought and institutions and for its power to mould social life.

REFERENCES

1 I refer especially to the discussion of the 'starting mechanism' of exchange in Gouldner 1960 and to Blau's (1964) criticism of Gouldner. My own view is that the approaches of these two authors are complementary.

2 Cunnison's translation (1954) suppresses in many passages Mauss' concern with economic and psychological factors. Compare Mauss: 'Quelle est la règle de droit *et d'intéret* qui, dans les sociétés de type arriéré ou archaïque, fait que le présent reçu est obligatoirement rendu? ' (1966:148) and: 'In primitive or archaic types of society, what is the principle whereby the gift received has to be repaid? ' (Cunnison 1954:1). Compare also: 'ce type de droit et d'économie' (Mauss 153; Cunnison 5); omission by Cunnison of the last paragraph of Mauss 173; 'ces concepts de droit et d'économie (Mauss 267; Cunnison 70); 'en règles de droit, en mythes, en valeurs et en prix' (Mauss 275, Cunnison 77), etc. Recent criticism of Mauss by economic anthropologists sometimes reads as though it is based on translation rather than original.

3 For Lévi-Strauss' discussion of the notion of mediation see *La Pensée Sauvage*, Ch. VIII and *passim*.

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581 account, the meeting ruled that the cause of the marriage breakdown was the
586 husband's refusal to allow her to enter his garden. The attempted seduction, the
627 adultery, the escapades to Port Moresby, the violent words and acts that had characterised the marriage over the years were all declared to be blameworthy, but the most serious of the offences was the husband's act in denying his wife entry to the taro garden. This signified the breaking off of the basic exchange relation in a marriage whereby the man clears the garden, the wife harvests the taro, and cooks it, and the husband and wife both eat it. I was told that when this exchange relation is broken, the marriage itself breaks down.

Why it is the taro garden where exchange between husband and wife is so important will be discussed in Chapter VI. I am concerned here to show that in tracing the cause of a marriage breakdown, what the Orokaiva seem to be looking for is evidence of a breakdown in the area of gift exchange. As long as the husband still gives his wife taro, there may be considerable difficulties between them, but these are not *defined* as a breakdown in Orokaiva culture unless there is a breakdown in Obligatory exchange.

578 Another such case was that of a man who took sides in a quarrel between his
837 brother and another man who had been trying to rape, i.e. seduce by force, that brother's wife. I thought that the village generally would be on the brother's
571 side, as rape is disapproved of, but almost everyone took the side of the rapist and the man who took the side of his brother had to leave the village. The man who was expelled had a long history of trouble making. During my stay he had been involved in every fight except those between husbands and wives. He had also committed rape, his victim being a prohibited partner under the incest rules. His trouble was, so I was told, that no woman wanted him. I asked my informants why this was. The reason was that he had been married previously, he had maltreated his wife and she had run away. Now nobody would help him.

[583] And why would nobody help him? Well, brideprice had been paid for his first
[581] wife; it had been lost through his fault, and that was the 'real' reason why nobody supported him in the quarrel. Here again we notice that the cause of the trouble was the breakdown of an exchange cycle. When a man has been helped in paying brideprice he has an obligation towards his clansmen to hold his wife, raise a family and be a support for the others. He must manage the relationship with his own affines properly and make them into valuable exchange partners.

829 In both instances a basic exchange cycle had been broken and that was
431 thought to constitute the essence of the relationship. In the first case this was the exchange between man and woman in making their own contributions and
436 deriving their own benefits in the taro garden – a cycle of exchange which parallels the cultivation cycle of the taro itself. In the second case it was the exchange between clansmen which is complete only when the man who received the brideprice provides recruits for the clan, as well as a steady new affinal alliance. It does not concern me here whether psychologists would, in such cases, accept the exchange breakdown as the real cause of the social breakdown; I have illustrated that the Orokaiva view social breakdowns in this manner.

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Totoima's body, from which all derive their *ivo*. The feast seems to be the occasion *par excellence*, at which the primeval communion is re-enacted. This is, of course, a point that needs careful empirical demonstration, which will be given in Chapter VII. All I wish to suggest at this stage is the existence of at least one ritual device whereby the state of permanent *isoro* between social groups can be overcome, the re-enactment of a communion for which the Totoima myth provides the mythological charter. Such a communion may be brought about only by a long series of economic and ritual preparations, such as a feast requires; there must be an abundance of taro and of pig, there must be feathers and ornaments, new loincloths, musical instruments and guests willing to share in the communion. Above all, there must be skilful magic. Even then, the success of a feast is never predictable, and always hangs in the balance. Thus the communion between social groups, in this philosophy always remains problematic but, for various practical reasons (the need for alliances in a world at war) it is frequently attempted. The social philosophy of the Orokaiva, then, starts from the assumption of the gulf that yawns between man and man, and proceeds to delineate various techniques (of which the feast is one) to bridge it.

We are now able to see more clearly why among the Orokaiva social exchange is rarely effective unless prestations of economic value are exchanged between partners to mutual satisfaction. Relations between social groups are generally unsatisfactory and hostile, but they can be made harmonious if one side gives the other a feast, which the other side must reciprocate. The harmony thus established is an extraordinary state which is sure to be interrupted by subsequent conflicts, so that feasts must be held periodically to keep group relationships within the bounds of amity.

Relationships between individuals follow the same pattern, though gift exchange here takes the place of the larger and more formal feasts. If no presents pass between two individuals for some time, this is thought to signify a breakdown of amity and the gradual re-establishment of the *natural* hostility between man and man. Only gift exchange prevents Orokaiva society from presenting the perfect living model of Hobbes' war between all and all. It is largely for this reason that I have chosen gift exchange as the basic principle in my analysis of Orokaiva society.[2]

3. *Towards a Model of Exchange*

The feasting myth quoted in the previous section seems to me to embody the essence of Orokaiva social philosophy, in as far as it explains the basic nature of gift exchange relations. My next task will be to translate this myth into the more abstract language of social science, as must be done if its ideas are to be made part of anthropological discourse.

A feast tends to be held by two social groups between whom relations have turned somewhat sour. There may have been a war, or a murder, or some other grievous act of violence or there may have been no more than minor friction between them. One side may suspect that the other performed black magic against them. Generally speaking, however, by the premises of Orokaiva social philosophy, both sides will have been storing up some grievances against the other. Often neither side will be willing to admit to the major responsibility for

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the ill feeling that has built up; usually any attempt to assign guilt would lead only to further conflict, as the record is too tangled to be satisfactorily sorted out. The party which decides to hold the feast and to invite the other side may or may not admit that it regards itself as guilty, and that it owes the other side a debt. The past is simply set aside and the host acts as though the feast is a free gift, an expression of disinterested love and generosity. The guest at the feast accepts the same fiction.

Accordingly, if we regard a feast as an occasion for social exchange, as the Orokaiva undoubtedly do, the basic objects of exchange are repentance and forgiveness. Sometimes a few words are exchanged between host and guest to express this notion of forgiving and forgetting, though I do not suppose this is invariably the case. On one occasion I invited a man to have a feast with me, after some months during which he had been acting unpleasantly towards me for reasons I did not quite understand. I must have unwittingly offended him. After the meal he said: 'I did not really know you before now.' This implied that he was willing to forgive and forget whatever had previously annoyed him. At the same time, the fact of my inviting him indicated that I was sorry for whatever I had done wrong. What we were really exchanging was a willingness to change our attitudes to each other, which involved some effort for both of us. Whether this is, in practice, done genuinely or only ritually does not concern me here as I am discussing feasts from the viewpoint of Orokaiva collective representations. When two groups feast together, each has the obligation to feel sorry for any offence he has caused and to forgive any offence caused by the other side. It is only thus that the feast can interrupt the inherent enmity between man and man. Through the sharing of meat the two sides re-enact the communion existing in primordial times when men, as brothers, shared the body of Totoima.

An essential part of any feast is that the host should offer meat to his guest. But it is a total misapprehension of Orokaiva social philosophy to believe that it is the meat that is being exchanged for forgiveness. If that were so, it would not be essential for the two parties to consume it together. Certainly, if I have offended another person, I may make him a gift of meat in reparation. This is often done. But the reconciliation between the parties is not effected by such a gift alone. There must in addition be commensality (the common eating of taro) and communion (the common eating of meat). The meat used in such a communion is not an object of exchange. It is better described as a mediating element which makes possible the actual transaction (i.e. the exchange of repentance and forgiveness). Orokaiva are quite definite that there can be no true repentance and forgiveness between men unless meat is consumed between them. One may therefore regard meat as a *necessary* mediating element in this transaction.

Perhaps the most useful insight to be derived from Orokaiva social philosophy is that the natural form of a social relationship is cyclical and moves regularly from hostility to reconciliation and back to hostility. In other words, the Orokaiva do not see the model of a friendship, as do Westerners, in the form of a perpetual harmony, so that every conflict that arises is regarded as a deviation from the model. On the contrary, Orokaiva consider conflict as intrinsic to the model. This is true also in the discussion of quite intimate relationships: father and son, husband and wife, and so on. The perfect relationship is not one where

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829 no quarrels occur (Orokaiva do not seriously envisage such a relationship), but
571 one where quarrels are resolved before they have gone too far. The Orokaiva would feel more affinity with the sociology of Simmell and Blau than with that of Weber and Parsons. A bad relationship is one where the cycle *reconciliation – quarrel – reconciliation* is interrupted, and the relationship is broken off, or the quarrel intensified until one of the parties resorts to sorcery.

829 We may express this view of social relations diagrammatically in the following
571 simple model, where (*a*) stands for exchange partners, (*b*) for objects of exchange, and (*c*) for mediating elements.

574 MODEL 1



This model, first of all, contains three binary oppositions. The exchange partners are represented as opposed to one another. This corresponds to empirical reality because at any feast the persons present always belong in one of these two categories. Secondly, there are two objects of exchange between which a conversion takes place. One partner gives repentance and receives in return forgiveness. I have already pointed out that in practice both parties may feel guilty so that both may be offering repentance and forgiveness at the same time, but this is not essential and not included in the model. Furthermore, I have assumed that the host is the repentant party. This assumption is made because the person who gives the feast demonstrates thereby that he is more anxious than the other to restore the relationship. It is he, therefore, who is playing the humbler role and this is expressed in the model by making him the 'repentant' party.

It will be clear that an expression of repentance does not necessarily imply that the other party will offer forgiveness. A man may invite another to a feast and the other may refuse to come. In that case there has been repentance but no forgiveness and no feast. The exchange cycle has been interrupted by the other's refusal. But if the guest comes, he indicates that he is at least willing to forgive. Even then, the transaction may break down. There may be angry words between host and guest; the guest may expect some additional reparation and not be satisfied with what he gets. The ideal model of Orokaiva social relationships, however, assumes that the conversion will be successful.

The third binary opposition is between the mediating elements. I have already said that Orokaiva social relations move from a state of permanent strife marked by acts of hostility to temporary reconcilations mediated by the common eating of meat. There is justification for treating these concepts as binary oppositions. I have demonstrated that the common eating of meat is a mediating element because without it no exchange of repentance and forgiveness takes place. It

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goes without saying that acts of hostility are also mediating elements as, in their absence, there would be nothing to repent or to forgive.

In addition to three binary oppositions, the model contains a cyclical movement. One may start reading the diagram at any point on the cycle. For instance, one may start with acts of hostility, *isoro*. (According to Orokaiva philosophy, such acts require no special explanation.) These are followed by repentance, shown by the host in inviting the victim of these presumed acts of hostility to a feast. The sharing of meat follows, after which the guest, either in words or gesture (and probably by subsequent actions), indicates that he has forgiven whatever he had been angry about. Then, sooner or later, social relations lead to new acts of hostility and the cycle starts again.

While this model expresses adequately the Orokaiva view of social relations, we must admit at once that the feasting myth from which it was derived communicates a more complex message than this. It deals, in fact, with two exchange cycles at once, but overtly the myth does not mention the sharing of meat at all. On the contrary, it is concerned only with the sharing out of taro. The exchange partners are again host and guest; the exchange, as told in the myth, is between a shortage of taro provided by the hosts and a fight provided by the guests. The mediating elements are: the removal of the taro by a thief (arising out of the shortage; bringing about the fight) and the removal of the demigods responsible for the feast. The exchange cycle created by these elements reproduces the sequence of the myth:

MODEL 2



It will be noticed that the exchange cycle is incomplete. In the next section of this chapter, I shall show that exchange cycles in myths are always incomplete, and I shall explain why this is a special characteristic of myths. Indeed, the chief message of the feasting myth is that the incomplete cycle shown above should *not* be repeated; instead it is the following cycle that has become institutionalised:

MODEL 3



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829 571 574 [243] [789] This model is very similar to the exchange cycle in which meat is served as the mediating element. I have already pointed out that taro, displayed on a huge and impressive platform, is an essential part of the gifts offered at a feast. I did not then quote the folk explanation of this. I was told that harvest feasts are beneficial to the donors because feasts make the taro grow well. On further enquiry I found that the Orokaiva believe that taro *always* grows well except if sorcerers from other villages put a spell on it. One of the rituals at a feast is a kind of rain-making ritual performed by medicine men from among the *guests*. When I asked: 'Why the guests?', I was told that they would be expert at removing the bad magic from the gardens because, in all probability, it was they who put it there! We can now see why it is that the guests' forgiveness, in the model, leads directly to a magical increase of taro. I was also told that the increase in the taro harvest would enable the hosts to give another feast soon afterwards. As this second feast would normally not be given to the same group as the first, the idea suggested by the model is that successful feasts enable a village to give an infinite series of feasts, thus attracting an infinite number of allies, one after the other, and becoming infinitely powerful.

574 182 [243] [789] [728] In reality, however, this infinite series is interrupted by disappointing harvests and other misfortunes. Such misfortunes are ascribed to the sorcery of enemies, and in order to remove this sorcery, a *peka* is made with the enemies. A feast is held; and it is thought that matters will again improve. There is a periodicity of shortage and abundance, coinciding with the quality of external relations. Prior to the *pax Australiana*, bad external relations caused frequent warfare, the marauding of gardens or the lack of attention to gardens. Feasts had to be held occasionally so that the intensity of warfare would not lead to a serious depletion of food stocks. Feasts thus produced an abundance of food, because they provided peace, or at least a respite from war. The institution of feasting kept the scale of warfare down to a level which the people could economically afford. This ecological basis of the cyclical movement between war and peace is well documented in Rappaport's book about the Tsembaga (1968).

574 243 In terms of the model developed in this chapter we may express this cyclical process as follows:

MODEL 4



This exchange cycle belongs to the level of ecology rather than of social relations. The exchange partners in the model are man and his garden. The objects of exchange are the man's extra labour, needed to make a feast garden, and the abundance of taro that his garden can provide in good seasons. But it will not do so merely in response to man's labour. Labour alone cannot

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exhibited at every feast for guests to take home. This is an essential mediating element in the social exchange between hosts and guests, and appears as such in model 3. But why does this taro have to be there? What does it do? Why can it function effectively as a mediating element between guests and hosts? The answer to these questions lies in the myth about the origin of feasting (model 2). This myth tells the Orokaiva that if they have a big heap of taro at a feast, they *can* have effective social exchange between hosts and guest. The myth also tells them that this heap of taro is essential. The starting mechanism thus provided by the myth for the social relationship is essentially a magical one. It is a magical code rather than a moral norm, even though it has become institutionalised almost like a norm. Of course, the starting mechanism, like all magic, can fail on occasion. But unless the magic is used, there can never be social relations.

REFERENCES

1 For location of Hamburata, see Fig. 10.

2 After writing this chapter, I found that Sahlins has also been interested in Hobbes' social philosophy as in some way anticipating contemporary ideas about primitive exchange ('Philosophie politique de l' "Essai sur le don" ', 1968). Especially close to Mauss' thought is Hobbes 'Fourth Law of Nature – Gratitude' (*Leviathan*, Part I, Ch. XIV).

A [See Category 574, p. 59--Analyst]

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In any case, there are no strong economic or political reasons to prevent the splitting of the patrimony. Nor are there religious reasons, because every married male is fully competent to carry out ritual in the garden he is cultivating. The Orokaiva do not have primogeniture in the sense intended by Raglan (1963:100); it is not in the *enda mama* that the spirits of the ancestors are reincarnated, but in all the individuals of the extended family. The *enda mama*, therefore, is not the sole channel of charisma, but rather a kind of revered manager. He usually contrives to keep the patrimony together through the respect and obedience that is due, in Orokaiva custom, to a father and elder brother. I know of several instances where this authority was challenged and found that, in practice, the sons of younger brothers were not cut out of the patrimony, but their share was cut out and the relationship was severed.

Informants were all agreed that at any time either the *enda mama* or the junior member of a land-holding corporation may opt out of the relationship: such a separation involves, first of all, the breaking down of a social relationship in which protection is exchanged for deference and obedience. Therefore such a breakdown involves a high cost for both partners. When I inquired into some breakdowns that actually happened at Sivepe, I was given two kinds of explanation: (*a*) the senior partner broke off the relationship because he was not obeyed; (*b*) the junior partner broke off the relationship because the senior 'did not look after the land properly'. The first kind of explanation suggests that the elder partner, not receiving obedience, no longer received any rewards from the relationship and therefore terminated it. The second kind of explanation is more obscure as I never could find out just *how* the seniors had failed to protect the land. I gather there had been bad harvests, that the juniors thought something was wrong with the land, or that the senior had done something to provoke sorcery which endangered all the land of his lineage. Whatever the details, the juniors felt that the cost of deference to their elder brother was no longer warranted, in view of the amount of 'protection' they received. There was no fear, in any of these cases, that such a separation would be followed by retribution, physical, magical or supernatural. As I showed in Chapter III, the Orokaiva accepts fraternal strife as a natural consequence of events in primal time.

When such separations occur within a three-generation extended family, they are regarded by the community as (minor) misfortunes. On the other hand, they are regarded as normal when they occur between first cousins in a four- or five-generation lineage. Implicit in such judgements is a notion that there is a lower and an upper limit to the useful size of corporate groups. The young man who loses land rights because he has nobody to 'speak for him', obviously needs incorporation in a group. The secure man in middle age who has his land interests cut out of the control of the *enda mama* obviously feels that the useful upper limit of the corporate group has been exceeded. We may express the transactions at the lower and upper limit of the useful size of groups in the following exchange cycles:

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MODEL 13



MODEL 14



Models 13 and 14, when considered together, represent two phases of the history of a family. In the first phase a man who has separated out, aided by his sons, establishes his own landed estate. Gradually, he adds to his estate in various ways (conquest, inheritance from maternal relatives, etc.) and he adds to the number of adherents to whom he is *enda mama*. Before two generations have elapsed, the estate thus established will probably be subdivided again. The process of incorporation and subdivision repeats itself *ad infinitum*, and may be expressed in the following cycle:

MODEL 15



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adjoining village, might receive land at a later date when that woman's daughter married, according to the rule, in her mother's home village. This kind of pattern is described by Hogbin (1967:24) for the Wogeo, who operate a system of land dowries in conjunction with second-degree patrilateral cross-cousin marriage. 423 425 583

Often land is granted, on a temporary or even life-long basis, to persons other than sisters or daughters. Land transfers may arise in a variety of social relationships which cannot be easily categorised. In Inonda, where the village domain is rather large, land is often lent by one lineage to another so that cultivation areas can be close together or contiguous. This is done because people like to work at not too great a distance from one another. In Sivepe, some land loans were made from a similar motive, mostly for rubber gardens. When migrants from Garombi[2] settled in Sivepe, several grants of land were made to them, both for taro and yam gardens. Such arrangements do not usually extend beyond the life time of the recipient although I do know of exceptions. If the gift endures, it signifies a close and permanent bond between families who may be unrelated by kinship. 582 423 425 [613] [166] [571]

From the viewpoint I have adopted in this work, two questions are of special interest in the analysis of land transfers: what social benefits are being exchanged between the partners; and what are the symbolic motives for using land as an object of mediation in these relationships? In order to approach these questions, I shall first cite some situations in which land transfers are of practical use and common occurrence: 121

1. Land transfers from wife's father to daughter's husband used to be very common, especially in the early years of marriage. A man was expected to help his wife's father with gardening and other tasks, and to stay with him for a year or so. During this period, the father-in-law gave the couple a garden for their own use. On occasion, this might be a garden to which the daughter had been granted a permanent usehold. This type of bride-service is very much on the decline today, as the payment of a substantial bridewealth in money acts as a substitute. I encountered the custom once or twice and found that the son-in-law regarded himself as the father-in-law's 'worker' or servant. We may therefore regard this type of land transfer as offering to the donor the satisfaction of seeing the receiver reduced in social status. 423 583 425 [558]

2. In the other types of cases I shall mention, transfers of land do not place recipients in a position of social inferiority. Certainly, in many cases harvest gifts are expected from the borrowers of land but these tend to be small in size and to lack any implications of status difference. For instance, many transfers are made by widowers. These men have a choice between attaching themselves to the family of a son, a daughter or a sister's son. In Sivepe, I found that each of these choices was made twice in a total of six cases with which I am familiar. In all the cases where an old man attached himself to a daughter or sister's son, he made transfers of land to those who looked after him. The choice he makes is prompted primarily by mutual affection but nonetheless his position is greatly strengthened by the knowledge that he has some tangible way of showing his gratitude, namely in the form of land. If he is unhappy with one relative and moves to another, some part of his inheritance will probably move with him. 423 431 736

3. Cripples and widows are often in a similar position. They may need a

community purpose. Whenever a new village is built it is necessary for some individual to give garden land. Often several individuals give a piece each, but such a gift does not entitle the donor to decide just who should live on each house site, nor to control in detail what residents do with their housing sites. Trees planted by householders remain theirs in perpetuity. Such gifts to the community are not balanced by any specific reciprocal gifts or services, but the donors benefit by the contiguity of the village to their gardening land and perhaps, in a diffuse way, they benefit in social and religious status. Similar gifts have also been made in recent times for co-operative cash-cropping ventures, such as rice-growing in the late 1940s and a recent rubber co-operative in Sivepe. Here again, the total 'company' land was contributed by a number of people, some of whom shared out parcels to persons interested in planting rubber trees. In such cases, donors told me they acted for the good of the community, and everybody emphasised that the recipients incurred no obligation.

Let us now summarise briefly what social benefits are being exchanged between partners in land transactions. Frequent as they are, voluntary land transfers are always treated, in ideological statements, as departures from a regular and more secure patrilineal pattern. It is a though a maternal uncle or affine or distant agnate has voluntarily assumed the role of fictional father of the borrower. One receives a benefit which, in the 'normal' state of affairs, would be given only to a younger brother or son. I do not know of cases where long-term borrowing of land in itself sufficed to induce a man to change his clan affiliation, as seems to happen among the Garia. In one case I quoted, a man adopted the lender's plant emblem, thus emphasising the element of fictional fatherhood. Other informants regarded this as entirely proper and highly sympathetic behaviour, though totally voluntary. Harvest gifts, however, were not wholly voluntary but expected. So was a certain filial attitude of loyalty, obligatory avoidance of quarrels, and willingness to perform supportive services. Only in the case of a son-in-law performing bride service did such an obligation place the borrower in a servant-like position. On the contrary, in most of the cases I quoted it was the lender who felt the stronger need to attract the borrower and enter into a closer relationship with him. For instance, the donor would often have a strong desire for a reliable military and political alliance with the borrower. If supportive familial services were needed, as in the case of old men and widowers, these services were not provided in repayment for land, but in fulfilment of a kinship-determined social obligation. By making a gift of land, the donor was doing no more than express his quasi-paternal sentiments.

We may conclude that, strictly, land is hardly ever an 'object of exchange', in that one cannot suggest any specific major counter-gift or counter-service which could be used to reciprocate. Allegiance and protection, benefits which the land-borrower usually does furnish, cannot be bought with land. They may be given as a response to quasi-paternal support and the enhancement of economic, social and ritual status. Social benefits of this kind are regularly exchanged between non-agnates. In fact, it may be said that it is from social exchanges of this kind between non-agnates that Orokaiva society derives its cohesion or, to use Lawrence's phrase, maintains its security circle.

Why is land appropriate as a mediating object in such exchanges of social

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423 benefits between non-agnates? One might answer this question in a preliminary
431 way by saying that land is the only valuable permanent economic asset the
571 Orokaiva have at their disposal for the making of gifts to relatives and close kin.
[169] Such gifts, apart from their economic significance, buttress social relationships both inside and outside the clan. The recipient is induced to maintain or assume a filial attitude towards the donor, with all the political implications this may have; a requirement evident not only from the social responsibilities he is apt to accept but also from the magico-religious care he must take of the spirit (ancestor of the donor) resident on the land.

423 Land gifts made to non-agnates should be considered not solely from the
431 viewpoint of sentiment, but also of their social consequence. When gifts are
593 made to a sister or daughter, the husband or son or the recipient must subsequently, in regular daily practice, show increased allegiance to her family. The *enda mama* of that land has become, in some ways, similar to a true father. The recipient is made to feel, however gently, that he is a dependent. Furthermore, it is a situation which it behoves him to manipulate; his rights are always ultimately uncertain. He must try to tighten his hold over the land, and in the end he can do this only by making himself loved, indispensable and redoubtable in the eyes of his maternal family.

423 The key to the significance of land in mediating relationships of this type lies
425 in the continuing doubt as to the permanence of the land transfer. At the outset it is often for a single growing season. Sometimes a man is told that he may keep the land as long as he resides in the village, or for his lifetime. But in practice his tenure depends on the course of his relationship with the donor. He may even be told that the land will be his permanently, though this is commonly only when he is the original owner's sister's or daughter's son. Such a promise of permanent occupancy, however, is never tantamount to ownership. In the next section we shall show that it remains hazardous and unwise to grow cash crops such as coffee on land given by the maternal family as long as fifty years previously, because even after this long interval claims can be made for the return of the land or of the proceeds from the crop. Thus a man has to pay very special respect to his maternal family and have regard to its wishes, if he desires continued enjoyment of the land. No other type of gift could do so much to ensure that he will feel a dual allegiance to both his paternal and maternal family.

We may summarise this relationship with the maternal family, for successful cases, in the following diagram. It will be noted that this diagram is basically similar to model 13, but there are significant differences in benefits exchanged: a maternal relative has no 'control' over the land-borrower, nor does the latter owe him any 'obedience'. Conversely, the land is not unconditionally available to further the best interests of the useholder's paternal family.

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One might well regard such immoderate claims as the response to a breakdown in the social exchange relationship. According to model 17, increased rights over land should mediate an *increased* quasi-filial allegiance, implying an increased willingness to aid and share with maternal relatives. Such, however, was rarely in evidence. On the contrary, most coffee-growers, engrossed in the new task of growing coffee, tended to ease up on their family obligations, gave fewer feasts and were apt to neglect their maternal relatives. This was especially so because Church influence reduced the scope of initiation ceremonial which is one of the traditional key functions of the maternal family. Certainly the maternal family hardly shares at all, under normal circumstances, in the increased wealth generated by coffee-growing. Thus the uterine landowner feels relatively alienated from his affluent nephew.

In order to demonstrate the importance of quasi-filial allegiance as a factor in land transactions, I shall cite one case, again from Inonda, where coffee gardens are being run profitably on land over which the grower holds only 'permissive' rights. The three coffee gardens established in 1955, and still harvested in 1967, are on land owned by the Endehi'undi clan but relinquished after a defeat in war. It has been used by Andiriha of Inonda since 1915. When Inonda people started to grow coffee, Endehi'undi reclaimed this land. Inonda paid $32 in cash, as well as pigs, traditional valuables and taro, in other words, a very substantial consideration (Crocombe and Hogbin *ibid.*: 73) After a few years, as Andiriha continued to benefit from the coffee, it became obvious that Endehi'undi did not regard this consideration as a *sale* price as Andiriha hoped they would do. They saw it as no more than a proper display of quasi-filial allegiance, and expected this sort of gesture to be repeated, or to recover the land.

The Andiriha leader now invited a widower belonging to the Endehi'undi group to move into his household. The invitation was accepted and in 1967 the old man was still there. There was no further trouble over the coffee although Andiriha did not tempt fate by making further plantings. By Orokaiva legal concepts, the balance was restored. By a shrewd manoeuvre, the Andiriha leader had found a way to offer increased quasi-filial allegiance in such a way that the profit from the coffee gardens was not reduced too much.

Instances of this kind help us to understand what was involved in the Orokaiva system of residual or dual rights over land and dual allegiance owed by individuals to different families from which land useholds are derived. We have long tended to believe that the basic co-operating groups in primitive societies are *corporate* groups. The Orokaiva data presented here show a second possibility: namely a system by which individuals derive their land, and therefore their sustenance, from a cluster of corporate groups in only one of which they are a corporate member, although they maintain permanent exchange relationships with the others. These other corporations do not make them permanent gifts but leave them conditional upon the successful continuation of the relationship. The fact that a man holds land on such terms *forces* him to continue the relationship.

It is impossible, therefore, to say just what constitute 'residual' rights in land. In the example I analysed, it appears that a group's rights include rights to coffee when it lives in another village, but not when a member of that group stays in the house of one of the growers and is fed by that grower's wife. Perhaps the

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best definition of 'residual rights' would be 'benefits that are claimed when the social exchange relationship has broken down'. They are a sanction applied to punish the loosening of quasi-filial allegiance. 423 425 571

The case of Inonda is atypical as the entire village domain is held under an arrangement derived from the ideology of exchange. A more frequent pattern is for an individual to own some blocks of land in virtue of more or less permanent gifts. In neither case does this land mediate sacred and indissoluble bonds. In the case of patrilineal inheritance, the individual violates no supernaturally sanctioned rule if he cuts himself loose from his *enda mama* (and often keeps his land). In the case of land gifts, he may also cut himself loose if bonds of affection and expediency weigh less with him than the cost of satisfying his donor. If he should break with his donor, there is likely to be theft, intrigue, sorcery and perhaps violence and it is quite unpredictable who will eventually occupy the land.

If a man has only gift land at his disposal, he is in an insecure position in his relations with his exchange partners. This seems to be the case in Inonda. If a man has only patrimony land, we may assume that he has no close bonds outside his extended family and lineage, as such close bonds would probably have led to offers of land. Such a person has too narrow a base of social support in the community to count for much, and to counter effectively challenges to his position and property that will be made from time to time.

7. *Conclusion*

It remains to be shown that the facts and analysis of land transactions illustrate the general principles set out at the beginning of this chapter. I have dealt with a series of social relationships in which one partner has a strong need to identify with the other, to maintain a stable and permanent bond and to obtain what the other has to give. This need was sometimes social, sometimes economic, sometimes emotional, sometimes religious. All these bonds depended heavily on land for their efficacy. 423 571

I have shown that a donor of land does not necessarily separate himself irrevocably from the land as such, but from the usehold of it and thus from the productivity of the land for a certain period. There are no return payments which can ordinarily compensate for the gift, the main purpose of which is to mediate a certain social relationship. The donor can never quite know in advance whether the gift will be efficacious, as the receiver of the land may not, in the end, make the social prestations for which the donor hopes. The receiver is usually someone from whom substantial social support, in one form or another, can be expected. The relationships arising in land transactions are therefore precisely those which my model was designed to interpret. 423 425 571

In the introduction to this chapter, I argued that a gift could be regarded as a 'mediating element', for the purpose of my analysis, only if there is identification between the donor and the mediating element. In the case of land, we have seen that the owner strongly identifies himself with the lineage spirits believed to be resident on the land. The land is a part of him, just as his ancestors are a part of him. By transferring the land to another person he causes that other person in turn to identify himself with the land. He is thus magically 423 425 775

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imbued with the spirit of the donor and (ideally) compelled to behave as though he owed the owner quasi-filial allegiance. This is a magical action of precisely the kind I envisaged in the introduction to this chapter.

Finally, a transfer of land may be maintained indefinitely as long as, in the donor's view, it has 'virtue', i.e. as long as it mediates the kind of relationship the donor desires. But when the relationship breaks up, for one reason or another, the owner desires to have his land returned to him. This is why 'residual rights' on cash cropping land are so awkward. The modern age, the desire for money, the commitment of productive effort outside the range of the security circle all tend to disrupt the relationships envisaged by the lender of land. Meanwhile, modern political, judicial and administrative institutions have taken over many of the functions of the old-time alliances which were bolstered by land gifts.

I have explained in detail why traditionally the Orokaiva considered land to have 'virtue' as a mediating element in their most intimate alliances. In particular it mediates the bonds between husband and wife, spirits and living, paternal, junior–senior agnates and maternal family, and between an indefinite category of close friends.

Land may also act as a mediating element in a negative exchange between a sorcerer and a person who has aroused the anger of that sorcerer, as happens when the former blights the crops of the latter by placing a curse on the land. In many situations of this sort, events which we would class as metaphysical, physiological or climatological are explained as arising out of social exchange. Such beliefs tend to increase the importance attached to the maintenance of satisfactory social exchange relations because the averting of misfortune in the metaphysical, physiological and climatological realms is made conditional upon successful social relations.

The prosperity and opulence of the land thus becomes a measure of its owner's moral and spiritual wellbeing and the amity with which he is regarded by his fellow men. A good man is a good gardener: a good gardener is a good man. This equation is not arrived at by the Orokaiva with the aid of some Frazerian notion of contagion, but on the assumption that the good man has good exchange relations: therefore nobody would wish to harm his garden; therefore the garden must necessarily be in perfect condition. In this as in many other instances exchange is used as the *explicans* of what might well be explained in many other ways. It is because of such gratuitous use of exchange as *explicans* that I am inclined to regard it as a key concept in Orokaiva philosophy.

REFERENCES

1. I am using the term 'transcendental' in the sense of Schutz 1967 who demonstrates the transcendental expenses arising in social relationships.
2. For the location of Garombi, see Fig. 10.
3. These growers held certificates of title issued by the Higaturu Local Government Council, but these certificates have no legal force. I shall discuss in the next section of this chapter the pressures by which the Orokaiva are gradually being induced to establish sole titles.
4. Money as the means of salvation is a theme of many millennial cults, as is argued in detail by Burridge 1969 (*passim*, but see especially pp. 41–6).

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121 much the same view of gifts of staple foods as I shall present here. He writes:

> The character of the goods exchanged seems to have an independent effect on the character of exchange. Staple foodstuffs cannot always be handled just like anything else. Food is life-giving, urgent, ordinarily symbolic of hearth and home, if not of mother. (*ibid.* 170)

I am wholly in agreement with this, except that I do not see why we should confine this argument to staple foods. Many other gifts objects have a similar symbolic quality and are 'socially not quite like anything else'. The essential point, however, is that Sahlins clearly recognises that the symbolic quality with which an object is invested helps to determine how it is used as a gift:

> From this several characteristic qualities of food transfers appear to follow. Food dealings are a delicate barometer, a ritual statement as it were, of social relations, and food is thus employed instrumentally as a starting, a sustaining, or a destroying mechanism of sociability. (*ibid.*)

824 The present chapter elaborates these ideas, as applied to taro gifts among the
431 Orokaiva. With the aid of some recorded myths, I shall try to show just how taro
501 is conceptualised, in what precise sense it is symbolic of 'hearth and home', and
121 specifically, in what sense it is symbolic of 'mother'. Secondly, I shall distinguish between two specific ritual statements that can be made with the aid of taro and show that these are indeed concerned with the starting and the sustaining of social relations. I shall show on the basis of mythological and ritual data that the two statements may be viewed as standing in a binary opposition: a masculine gift of raw taro inaugurates relations whereas a feminine gift of cooked taro maintains them.

Taro has a special position in the Orokaiva exchange system in that it symbolises commensality. Persons who exchange taro are either in fact or symbolically commensal. Thus taro exchanges are an almost infallible index of intimacy: once two persons have established a certain degree of intimacy, taro exchanges inevitably follow. The same cannot be said for any other object of mediation, not even pigmeat (which is exchanged only in certain specific circumstances) or coconut and areca (which are given, as a matter of custom, to even very casual acquaintances). I could put this more clearly perhaps by suggesting that the network of intimate associations maintained by any individual Orokaiva coincides with that individual's taro exchange network.

In the second part of the present chapter I shall refer to a somewhat detailed, statistically based, study of taro exchange networks. This study aims at answering the following questions: what role do taro exchanges play in the strengthening of existing intimate bonds based on exchange? What role do they play in widening the range of objects exchanged between partners, i.e. in making an already close social relationship even more intimate?

602 It is obvious that taro exchanges cannot make any essential change in the
431 relationship of members of the same corporate group. By definition, this
824 relationship is already determined by the rules of incorporation. Thus, two brothers do not become more intimate by exchanging taro. On the other hand, if the taro is a feminine object of mediation, it may strengthen the relationship between the wives of two brothers, i.e. between persons whose existing intimate

bond is based on marriage exchange. Similarly, when married siblings of opposite sex reside in the same village, taro exchanged between their households would tend to strengthen the relationship between a sister and her brother's wife, and between her brother and her husband. Again among the Orokaiva where corporate groups are rather small, the kinship bonds between distant agnates would carry no implication of intimacy. Intimacy could in such cases be maintained only if the kinship bond were strengthened by fairly frequent exchange transactions for which taro would be a most appropriate object of mediation. In all these instances, taro exchanges mediate an extension of intimacy beyond the narrow confines of the corporate group.

So far we have restricted our discussion of exchange to the mediation of dyadic relations between partners. But if the Orokaiva exchange system is to solve the problem of the smallness of corporate groups, dyadic relations alone would clearly be of limited utility. As evidence presented in this chapter will show, the most intimate relationships are mediated by rather frequent gifts of taro, as well as a variety of other kinds of social interaction. There is a limit to the number of such relationships that any individual can maintain. The maintenance of such intimacy between a cluster of three households would require each household to carry on very frequent exchange with two others. While this is manageable, it could not be extended to the whole of a village such as Sivepe, with twenty-two exchanging households. Nobody can maintain twenty-one intimate associations all at the same time.

This kind of problem may be attacked by the setting up of a variety of corporate groupings on a basis other than kinship, and the study of such groupings is one of the main subjects of political anthropology. The Orokaiva, however, do not have corporate groupings of this type (no secret societies, no age sets, no economic institutions whereby 'big men' can achieve clear ascendancy over others). Instead, Orokaiva developed a principle of cohesion which I would call the circuit of mediation. The simplest way in which twenty-two households can be joined in intimate association by a circuit of mediation would be if there were intimacy between households 1 and 2, 2 and 3, 3 and 4, and so on, the chain being closed by an intimate association between households 22 and 1. Households 1 and 3 might not maintain an intimate association, but they would share intimacy with 2 and this would serve to mediate relationships between them. In theory such circuits could be unlimited in length, though the system would be rather cumbersome and expensive if extended too far.

I shall show in this chapter that the Sivepe taro exchange system presents a striking instance of such a circuit of mediation. The demonstration of this point unfortunately requires some painstaking and perhaps unduly tedious statistical analysis, which is to be presented as a separate paper elsewhere; only the basic argument is set out here.

The analysis of taro exchanges provides us with a model of the Orokaiva exchange system. We may not, of course, assume *a priori* that a model applicable to taro exchanges is applicable to anything else. That needs to be established empirically. If the culture is fairly homogeneous and the empirical data are reasonably full, the model ought to be confirmable in other areas such as marriage rules and the political system. If such confirmation is forthcoming, our

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records of taro gifts made in Sivepe village, the number of gifts made and received averaged 2.5 daily, ranging from a minimum of 1.3 averaged by the household least involved in the exchange system, to a maximum of 4.1 averaged by the household that made and received the most frequent gifts during the period. Allowing for variations in size, age and personality characteristics in the various households, these figures present a fairly homogeneous picture of customary exchanges.

Most of the gifts were made within the village, though a small proportion went to relatives and good friends who visited the village or who were visited by members of the Sivepe community. The usual practice was for the woman to bring home with her from the garden not only the taro her household was to eat that night and the next morning, but also taro to be used for giving away. When the recipient was of the same village, the taro would be cooked and presented ready to eat. The presentation was hardly ever made by the husband and most frequently by the children who were sent over with the cooked food and gave it to the named recipient without any ceremony. When there was any ceremony about the gift at all, the housewife was the proper person to make the presentation.

If I inquired who was the donor of the food I was often given the name of the woman, but sometimes the name of her husband, especially if the recipient was one of the husband's close kinsmen. There was always the notion that the gift served to maintain a specific relationship which would be involving either the husband or the wife. Strictly speaking, by far the greater proportion of the gifts were thus made to consanguines rather than affines. But it is better to regard the household as an integrated unit in its relations with other households, as the spouses undoubtedly mostly discuss together to whom food should be given. Essentially, taro gifts mediate relationships between households rather than individuals.

The size of the gifts was constant and seemed to be approximately what one person would eat for a meal. If a household made a gift of several meals to another household, this would be described to me as several gifts, with specification of the names of individual recipients. Here again, there was a contrast between the strict form of the gift and its overall significance. Strictly it was food given by one person in household A to one person in household B. When the family sat down to eat, the person who received the gift taro would share it out to others in the household. Therefore one may say that the gift was, in its general effect, from one household to another, but in strict form, it was emphasised that the social relationship between households A and B was mediated by one person in each household whose relationship was especially close. Thus, I might be told that 'X' sent taro to his brother 'Y'. In fact, X's wife would give the taro to one of her children who would take it probably to Y's wife. Y's wife would give it to Y, saying it came from X. Y would then give everyone a piece of it. A single gift would thus mediate quite a number of bonds.

As the gifts were very frequent, it seems a hopeless enterprise to specify on what occasions they were made; at first I thought taro gifts were made without any reason. Nonetheless, it is useful to discuss briefly a series of instances when taro gifts are considered appropriate. Let us first list a few of the more formal occasions when the housewife herself would make the presentation:

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Taro given for	*Maintaining relationships*	*Starting relationships*
Parts of plant given	tuber only	entire plant
State of preparation	cooked	raw
Donor's sex	female	male
Ancestral twin with which gift is identified	female sibling	male sibling

The giver of a feast is always a male. Taro is hardly ever the only gift made on a ceremonial occasion, as pigs, *hambo* etc. must also be presented. Nonetheless, taro is essential as a mediating element in the starting of a 'new' relationship.

What is the significance of taro gifts in this context? Sahlins' suggestion that staple food when used as a gift object is symbolic of hearth, home and mother seem less cogent here than in the case of gifts of cooked food discussed earlier. In previous chapters I have presented a method for interpreting actions aimed at the establishment of social relations. I suggested that some objects are believed to have a special potency in attracting partners and that this potency is believed to be due to the presence of the donor's spirit in the gift object and the transfer of that spirit to the recipient through the mediation of the object. The questions are these: why, and in what circumstances, can a *male* use taro for the mediation of social exchange? What is the mythical and philosophic charter for such mediation? What is the distinctive power of feast taro to compel the recipient to respond to the donor's wishes?

The spirit substance transferred by the *male* when he gives taro at a feast is derived from his ancestors who are present in the land and in the tops of the taro. Just which ancestors are thought to be present it is hard to say, but they include the dead of the lineage who have used the land and they also undoubtedly include the spirit of the original *dema*, Totoima. It is believed that only certain varieties of taro are capable of successfully transmitting spirit in this way. These are known as feasting taro (*pondo ba*). I obtained a list of them, but this list was not very instructive. It contained virtually all the taro varieties growing in the informant's garden, though I was able to identify a few grown varieties which were specifically stated to be unsuitable for feast taro. Only a small minority of plants growing in the gardens belong to these varieties.

Males can use taro for the mediation of social exchange only if they are feasting varieties and if they are displayed, complete with tops, in such a way that they may symbolically represent Totoima's son: lying on a *gaga* with their chests turned upwards. What message does this symbolism convey? Totoima's son appears in the myth in two apparently contradictory roles: that of victim (eaten by his father) and of victor (killer of his father). So much is indisputable fact. It is easy to see what the gift of a feasting taro might mean if we take this symbolism to its logical conclusion. The message would be: 'You may eat me now; I shall kill you later.' No informant actually explained this meaning to me and this interpretation is therefore no more than conjecture. It accurately represents, however, the actual traditional relationship between feasting partners. A man who gives a feast deprives and humbles himself; every one of his gifts is symbolically a sacrifice of himself. His feasting partner is, in a symbolic sense, his enemy with whom he is now becoming reconciled. In order to effect

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between co-residence and commensality, notions which the Orokaiva themselves clearly do not regard as synonymous. Persons who are co-resident are always, in practice, at least in part commensal, they are not necessarily wholly so. Not only old people but also bachelors and young women, single or married, receive gifts of taro from other households of which they are the specific recipients. Food they receive in their own residence may therefore be classed as a gift if they have not supplied raw food to the housewife on the same day.

To what extent is there a notion that food gifts should be balanced as between donor and recipient? According to the statistics, perfect balance is uncommon and occurs most often where exchanges are somewhat infrequent. In Table VI/1, I classified households according to the degree of balance in all intra-village taro gifts made to persons resident in other households. The code number 0 indicates perfect balance in the total number of gifts sent and received; the code number 6 indicates an imbalance greater than the proportion 75:25. Intermediate code numbers indicate a lesser amount of imbalance. At first sight, Tables VI/1 and VI/2 suggest that little importance is attached to balance in food gifts. In more than half the households, the total imbalance exceeds the proportion 60:40. Nor does there seem to be an ideological charter enjoining a person who has received a food gift to return that gift in the near future. The donor says he expects no return gift. If one asks him why he has made the gift he never mentions services or gifts received in the past for which he may be reciprocating. He will say, 'because that man is my wife's father's sister's son' or whatever the kinship relation may be.

A more careful look at the figures, however, makes one wonder whether such indifference to balance is the whole story. Some informants stated that though the donor expects no return gift, the recipient often likes to make one. Some families are more punctilious than others in this respect. The most punctilious of all was the leading family of Seho (H5, H12, H13, H14, H20, H21). They all had an imbalance smaller than the proportion 55:45. Only one other household in the sample achieved this low score.

In most of the households where there is an extreme inbalance, the explanation is that the household contains aged people who require help, or that the household is deeply involved in giving help to aged people. This factor accounts for the inbalance in households 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 10, 18, 18a, and 19. The imbalance in households 8 and 9 is explained by the fact that householder 8 was helping householder 9 to build a house. Householders 5, 15, and 17 were immigrants from Garombi who gave more than they received, probably because of an anxiety to become accepted and build up good relations in their new place of residence.

Finally, the notion of balance is implicit in the timing of many of the taro gifts. It was a very common practice indeed to make a return gift on the same day as a gift of taro had been received, or on the day immediately following. Though informants told me they were under absolutely no obligation to respond so urgently or to respond at all, the record shows that in practice they frequently did so. We must therefore conclude that the Orokaiva do have some notions which lead them to reciprocate taro gifts, even though there is no rule enjoining immediate balanced exchange.

I would suggest that the Orokaiva proceed from a notion that taro is a

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TABLE VI/1

SIVEPE: TARO TRANSACTIONS BY HOUSEHOLD

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Household Code No.	*Total Transactions*	*Sent*	*Received*	*No. of Partners*	*Degree of Imbalance**
1	58	40	18	9	4
2	37	1	36	6	6
3	41	26	15	9	3
4	57	35	22	9	3
5	101	54	47	14	1
6	70	45	25	4	3
7	87	24	63	12	5
8	56	33	23	3	2
9	71	40	31	6	2
10	58	21	35	5	3
11	68	36	32	10	1
12	117	59	58	8	1
13	85	44	41	7	1
14	101	52	49	7	1
15	60	34	26	11	2
16	60	37	23	13	3
17	79	50	29	14	3
18	62	9	53	10	6
18a	48	37	11	10	6
19	81	54	27	9	4
20	84	46	38	12	1
21	82	41	41	8	0

* Code: 0 = larger donor gives exactly 50% of gifts;
1 = larger donor gives 50–55%; 2 = larger donor gives 55–60%;
3 = larger donor gives 60–65%; 4 = larger donor gives 65–70%;
5 = larger donor gives 70–75%; 6 = larger donor gives over 75%.

mediating element in the perpetuation of social relations. Within a village, social relations of some sort exist between almost all the members. In my enquiries in Sivepe I came across only one instance of two men, both resident in Sivepe, who denied having or ever having had social relations of any sort with each other. There may have been one or two more instances I did not detect, but they would be very rare. Social relations between households in a village may range from very distant (when no taro gifts are exchanged) to very intimate (when taro gifts may be made four or more times per week). Many households have social relations which are close but not intimate, symbolised by taro gifts made a few times per month. The frequency of taro gifts is of course not the only way of symbolising intimacy, though it is the sign I found the easiest to quantify. It was my impression that those households which maintained the most frequent informal association with one another were also those who made each other the most frequent taro gifts. These were the households who were deeply dependent

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924 431 621 571 on one another in sentiment, in economic tasks, in political support. They would tend to side with one another in village disputes. Thus, taro gifts were a ritual statement in which one household expressed its desire for close association with another.

Now, on this level of association, mutuality and reciprocity are obviously essential if the association is to be established on an equal footing. The return gift should therefore not be considered principally as an obligation (arising from a 'norm of reciprocity') but as a ritual statement reciprocating the desire to maintain a close association. Here the question of the frequency of gifts is closely connected with the question of how intimate either side wishes the association to be. An increase of the frequency of gifts means a desire for a more intimate association. The recipient may wish to keep the association within certain limits. The Garombi migrants who gave more than they received seemed to be constantly trying to build up new alliances and were welcomed more warmly by some of the old residents than by others.

Failure to make a return gift of course does not always 'mean' that one is not interested in maintaining social relations of the closeness envisaged by the other party. There are many circumstances when people are not immediately in a position to make return gifts. In such cases I would not say that the recipient remains entirely without obligation, but rather that the obligation is delayed indefinitely. Thus a man may say he is giving food to his father or other senior relative because of some benefits received in the past. (He was himself fed by the senior person in his youth; he was helped with his bride-price, etc.) Or else a man will say that when his hosts visit his own village, he will then reciprocate. In fact guests customarily press their hosts to make an early return visit and hosts sometimes feel some obligation to do so. It is a pleasurable obligation no doubt, but it is clear that the purpose of such a journey is not to get one's taro back but to maintain the association.

It follows from this discussion that the households to which the most frequent taro gifts are made are those with which the greatest intimacy is desired. If the recipients, though fully capable of making equally frequent return gifts, reciprocate too half-heartedly, the donor household will probably reduce its gifts to the level acceptable to its partner. If the recipients are not capable of making equally frequent returns, the frequent gifts will continue, and the taro ledger will remain unbalanced. Thus, irrespective of the degree of balance, we may regard high frequency of taro gifts as a generally reliable index of intimacy of association. I am leaving out of consideration here the question, raised by Sahlins (1965), of whether degree of balance is determined by kinship distance. Exchanges of taro have a social as well as an economic aspect. Where the social aspect is uppermost (i.e. where the exchanges are not primarily based on need), they tend to be close and balanced, as long as both partners are satisfied with the prevailing frequency of interaction. Where the economic aspect is uppermost (i.e. where one partner is for some reason unable to harvest his own taro), no *social* importance is attached to imbalance and Sahlins' generalisation would probably hold for the Orokaiva of Sivepe.

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5. *Clusters and Chains, Two Patterns of Intimacy*

How can taro gifts mediate close associations among larger groups than dyads of exchange partners? This involves a complex sociological problem that cannot be solved in the framework of the present study: why do men tend to give disproportionate attention to a very small number of their closest associates and much less attention to a larger group who are still close and trusted friends? A principle of allocation clearly operates here: intimate relationships demand more time and energy than can be devoted to the entire circle of close friends. But it is by no means clear what is the role of intimates as distinct from other valued friends. This hierarchy of association, whatever its explanation, is very evident among Orokaiva, not only in the way in which individuals spend their leisure time and compose their co-operative groups, but also in their allocation of taro gifts among their exchange partners.

In Sivepe the number of exchange partners maintained by a household varies from three to fourteen, with an average of 8.5. The first (i.e. most frequent) partner is involved in an average of 38 per cent of all taro transactions, the second partner in 24 per cent, the third in 12 per cent while the other partnerships account for only 26 per cent of all transactions. It is clear that the first and second partners are in a very privileged position in comparison with the others.

A second way of describing the pattern of intimacy would be to assume that there is some community norm whereby a certain degree of intimacy is expressed by a specific frequency of interaction. My impressions, supported by the statistical data and some generalisations offered by informants, is that each household has a few preferential partners to whom it gives or from whom it receives taro at least twice a week, but often far more frequently. In this sense every household in my sample had at least two preferential partnerships. Ten households out of twenty-two had a third, five households a fourth and one (the Seho clan leader) had five preferential partnerships.

The data show that where households are linked by primary kinship, they mostly set up a 'preferential' taro partnership. Only 30 per cent of preferential partnerships, however, fall in this category. The rest can be accounted for only if land transactions, political considerations, and the total past history of personal relationships and transactions are taken into consideration.

For statistical reasons alone it would seem that preferential partnerships are worth some detailed investigation. They clearly add substantially to the number of intimates on whom an individual can count for support over and above those who can be depended on purely by virtue of membership of the same corporate group. In addition preferential partnerships are of crucial importance as a basis for close co-operation between sets of persons larger than the exchanging dyad.

In Fig. 8, all preferential partnerships in Sivepe are shown in sociographic form. A distinction has been made in the sociogram according to the extent to which social preference is mutual. Households A and B may be said to stand in a 'closest mutual relationship' (marked by a hard line), if B is a first or second partner to A and A is a first or second partner to B. If none, or only one of these conditions are satisfied, the relationship is shown by a wavy line.

Though a full analysis of taro gift patterns has to await separate publication,

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TABLE VI/2

SIVEPE: TARO TRANSACTIONS BETWEEN PREFERENTIAL PARTNERS

Household Code No.	*First Partner*	*Sent*	*Received*	*Second Partner*	*Sent*	*Received*	*Third Partner*	*Sent*	*Received*
1	H17	7	11	H2	16	0	H5	4	3
2	H1	0	17	H3	0	11	H17	1	4
3	H2	12	0	H17	4	4	H4	2	5
4	H5	15	12	H3	5	2	H7	6	0
5	H4	12	14	H6	11	7	H21	11	6
6	H7	33	12	H5	7	11	H4	2	2
7	H6	14	30	H19	5	11	H4	0	6
8	H9	13	16	H10	18	7	H7	2	0
9	H8	15	15	H10	16	7	H13	4	2
10	H8	7	17	H9	7	12	H11	3	4
11	H12	10	11	H20	18	4	H18	6	2
12	H13	17	19	H14	15	19	H11	12	10
13	H14	21	17	H12	19	16	H9	2	3
14	H13	16	21	H12	17	16	H15	6	8
15	H14	8	6	H16	6	7	H12	3	5
16	H17	8	6	H15	7	6	H7	7	0
17	H1	11	5	H16	6	8	H18	7	3
18	H18a	0	15	H17	3	7	H11	3	6
18a	H18	15	0	H19	8	4	H17	3	3
19	H7	24	5	H18a	4	8	H12	5	6
20	H21	28	19	H11	4	8	H5	4	4
21	H20	22	20	H5	6	11	H11	4	1



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Fig. 8. Taro gifts in Sivepe: sociogram of preferential partnerships. Households are numbered as in Fig. 9 (see p. 202). Straight lines indicate closest mutual relationships, while wavy lines indicate other preferential partnerships.

some generalities are given here, related to our general argument. Taro gifts were used especially to mediate relationships between neighbours, close kin, exchange partners, and with certain persons of special status such as leaders, magicians, and the like. The Garombi immigrants used the system somewhat differently from the old residents, as the former were more actively seeking new partnerships, especially with the more influential old residents.

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Graph analysis shows two chief patterns: the cluster and the circuit. From the viewpoint of the quality of social relationships, the cluster is obviously to be preferred, as it provides intimate one-degree links between all members of the community. No doubt the Orokaiva's traditional predilection for small villages of six households or so arose from the comfortable feeling that all households could then be intimate with each other. We find several clusters among Sivepe inhabitants, especially among Seho and Sorovi households, but if preferential partnerships did not exist except inside these clusters, the result would be a division of the village into very loosely connected cliques.

In fact, we find a second connecting principle which I have called the circuit, as it resembles the Hamilton circuit familiar in graph theory. A circuit of *n* households (H1, H2, H3 . . . , Hn) is defined as a set in which H2 has a

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'closest mutual relationship' with H1 and H3; H3 with H2 and H4 and so on. Closure of the circuit is achieved if Hn has a 'closest mutual relationship' with H(n – 1) and H1. The largest such circuit, or near-circuit, connects the great majority of households of all clans and may thus be considered a unifying principle for the village as a whole. The second, much more strongly constructed, links eleven households of the Jegase-Sorovi clans, but includes not a single Seho household. Even though this circuit of ten households contains two flaws (wavy instead of hard lines), it is most improbable that it would turn up by chance.

How circuits are generated in time becomes clear from a study of the recent immigrants from Garombi. Householder 17, before leaving Garombi, had no particularly close links in Sivepe; yet our survey shows him as having two preferential partnerships with old-time Sivepe residents, one Jegase and one Seho (H18 and H16 respectively).

A curious feature is the almost uniform practice of choosing immediate neighbours as preferential partners. It would be too simple, however, to suppose that there is a rule whereby one must have these specially frequent exchanges with one's neighbours. Certainly I never found a trace of such a rule. On the other hand there are quite complex considerations in the choice of house sites, such that there is the maximum correspondence between physical and social distance from others in the village. When social relations between neighbours become bad, one of them is liable to shift his house elsewhere, so he can be close to an intimate.

The circuit corresponds remarkably well to the Orokaiva system of clan formation. Thus the Jegase 'clan' in Sivepe is actually constituted by four totally unrelated groups, three of which migrated to Sivepe since the beginning of the century and which gradually grew into a single clan by a process of fusion (See Chapter X). They now occupy six houses and ancillary buildings on the Jegase-Sorovi circuit, and three houses which form a chain attached to that circuit, i.e. a total of nine houses. Each 'lineage' forms a short chain of its own, and the chains are mostly linked together by uterine bonds. Now it is precisely these uterine bonds which brought about the fusion of the groups of migrants into a single clan. Yet this clan was still far more fragmented than Seho. Therefore, there was not much incentive to clustering, which requires far greater intimacy than existed among the Jegase.

It is precisely the lack of intimacy between small social chains that produced the Sivepe circuits. As we have seen, these circuits are mathematical models built after the reality of residence and taro exchange patterns. It is characteristic of a circuit that no two households share the same 'closest mutual relationships'. Thus H2 and H3 have a 'closest mutual relationship' but H3 does not share the 'closest mutual relationship' between H2 and H1. It is in this respect that a chain is quite unlike a 'minimal cluster'. The chain arrangement has two practical consequences: if H1 falls out with H3, H2 will mediate; and if H1 and H3 wish to co-operate, H2 will normally be a party to the arrangements as these tend to be made in front of his house, in his hearing and probably in his presence. The structure provides for the possibility that H3 may draw in H4, H4 may draw in H5 and so forth. Actual cases of such political action will obviously tend to be

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less tidy but lateral communication by means of intermediaries was a pattern to be frequently observed.

The topographical position of a house was therefore at the same time a fixed position in the taro exchange network and in the network of alliances. One could almost tell from where a person lived what that person would do. When fierce arguments and hot abuse rang through the night as two households held a cutting dispute with each other, those households were likely to live at opposite ends of the village, either at far ends of the chain or at opposite ends of a wider and looser chain of associations which comprised the village as a whole.

The Seho clusters and the Jegase–Sorovi chain were at opposite sides of the village, but were linked to each other by two connecting chains, consisting largely of people who lived at the outer ends of the elongated village rectangle. One of these connecting chains was formed by men who came from Soroputa and who married wives from the Seho clan. (H5, H20-H21, H11, H12.) The other connecting chain consisted of Seho and Sorovi householders whose distinguishing feature was that they maintained rather wide taro exchange networks, had peaceful natures and tried to keep on friendly terms with almost everyone. (H14, H15, H16, H17). The links shown on the sociogram between the Jegase-Sorovi chain and the Seho people are of great interest as they show the degree of closeness between the two main clan formations (Jegase and Seho). Judging from the taro exchange network, these relations are not critically remote but on the other hand not so close that the two sides are in any danger of losing their separate identity.

Leadership in the two clans differed in a manner that is clearly recognisable on the graph. Seho had an aristocratic type of New Guinean 'big man' leadership, the leader (H12) having hardly any real intimates except primary kin who were rather numerous. These primary kin, however, between them, had intimate links with nearly everybody in the village. The leader had preferential partnerships and close connections with a few but not all the Garombi immigrants, using his close contacts as middlemen. The Jegase sociometric star (H5) had a far wider exchange network, including all the Garombi families, and almost nightly there were large gatherings in his *arara*. On the other hand, his primary kin links were far fewer; he depended on the systematic fostering of new associations for his challenge to the Seho leadership. Thus cluster and circuit, the two types of association found in Sivepe, each had its own characteristic form of leadership.

6. *Structural Implications*

We have found that gifts of cooked taro are essentially a woman's gift, and that these gifts, if made continuously at short intervals, are a ritual statement of the maintenance of intimacy between pairs of households. The exchange may be stated formally in the following diagram:

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628 In dealings between different villages, the use of a chain of mediators is extremely common. A will approach a fellow-villager B, who has connections in the other village; B will go to the other village and see C, his closest contact. C will then most likely go to D, one of the intimates of the person E with whom A desires to deal, and D will look for E. During the ensuing conversation, A and E will say very little, and it is the intermediaries who do most of the talking.

824 431 621 571 The intimate associate, often a neighbour, is thus extremely valuable, as he opens up a vista of alliances to which his partner has no easy access. A man's effective social network is therefore much wider than any network he could personally maintain by direct exchanges. Most of his effective alliances are vicarious and can be reached only through intermediaries.

The social network maintained by a sizeable circuit is therefore very considerable. It is greater than any solidarity group the Orokaiva could build up by maintaining their patrilineage bonds or by exclusively exploiting any other principle of kin group solidarity. The significance of gifts of cooked taro is that they maintain the intimate bonds needed to retain vicarious access to this network. Cooked taro mediates not only the exchange of intimate attachment, but also the exchange access to *alter's* private network of alliances.

If a village formed a perfect cluster, this kind of exchange could not happen, as all members share exclusively each other's most intimate alliances. Where a circuit structure prevails, a man's partner always has an intimate relationship he does not share, so that the man is dependent on his partner for access to that partner's distinctive exchange network. A society whose solidarity depends heavily on direct immediate exchange may have a rather wide network of alliances as long as it has strong institutional patterns of mediation. The importance of these patterns in Orokaiva society cannot, of course, be gauged by reference to taro exchanges alone, but it is now possible to inquire to what extent the model I have constructed on the basis of taro exchange applies in other areas of Orokaiva culture.

Clearly this model, if transposed to the level of marriage exchange, would include elements of both direct and generalised exchange. The cluster resembles direct exchange: the maintenance of relationships within the system depends entirely on benefits received from all households included in the system. On the other hand the chain has the circular form characteristic of generalised exchange. It includes households who receive no direct benefits from one another except the vicarious one of joint membership in the system. In some respects the chain, of course, differs fundamentally from a system of generalised exchange: the taro travels in both directions around the circle. But I have emphasised that taro is not strictly an object of exchange but of mediation. If there is a need to establish intimate social exchange between remote members of a chain, this will not be, as a general rule, for the exchange of identical benefits. Thus the benefits travelling in each direction along the chain may differ and may not belong to the same sphere of exchange.

While relationships within a cluster are very intimate, those within a large chain may require delicate diplomacy. Yet a chain does not, in my experience, contain members who are actively hostile to one another. The exchange of cooked taro has to to with the maintenance of friendly relations, and collapses if serious conflict arises. The management of serious conflict requires different

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objects of mediation, such as pig meat, which will be discussed in the next chapter.

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REFERENCES

1 The propagation of the taro plant (*colocasia esculenta*) is illustrated in Fig. 7.

2 Waddell's survey excluded gifts to household members. This may explain informants' initial hesitance in mentioning them.

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CHAPTER VII

PIGS

1. *Introduction*

While taro exchanges serve to maintain the basic social network used in transactions, the pig is the most common object of mediation in critical situations. Unlike taro, pig is not consumed as part of the ordinary diet, but is commonly described as a 'feasting food'. As feasts are held only to mark a crisis in social relations, it will be our task to investigate what makes pig meat specially suitable as a feasting food. One may, at the outset, answer this question with a remark about the physiological properties of pig meat: as the Orokaiva diet normally includes little first-class protein, any meal at which meat is served may be expected to have a specially invigorating and exhilarating effect. But in the present inquiry it does not suffice to give physiological explanations: our problem is to discover how the exhilarating experience of eating meat becomes symbolic and how it is magically utilised in the managing of social crises.

Pig meat is used both for the restoration of good relations after a quarrel or estrangement and for the establishment of new social relations. As such it serves a function in widening the social network. This function is hinted at in the basic pig myth about Totoima to which reference has been made earlier. When Totoima was killed, the joints cut from his body were distributed far and wide and caused all those groups who shared in it to multiply rapidly. This sharing may thus be regarded as a kind of communion which implies both social relations and the conferment of a blessing. Both these themes are strongly present in all ceremonies where pig meat is shared.

But there is a second theme as well: there is in every gift of pig meat the notion of a reparation, either for past services rendered or for past injuries suffered, even though these injuries on some occasions may amount to no more than the lapsing of social contact. The Totoima of the myth, of course, was guilty of many murders and his death was an occasion for dispelling many grievances. Thus the gift of pig meat implies not only a communion but also an expiation.

In treating pig as an object of mediation in exchange, I shall need to demonstrate specifically that in certain respects a gift of pig resembles a sacrifice. It must be shown that the offerer identifies with the pig that is given away or sacrificed, and that there is a belief in the 'virtue' or magical power of the sacrifice both in establishing a social link between sacrificer and human beneficiary and in strengthening the spiritual state of the sacrificer himself.

The data show that pig sacrifices may be regarded equally well as rites of communion and as rites of expiation. The key to their significance, however,

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lies neither in communion nor in expiation, as they are essentially magical devices to bring about a transformation in social relations with a partner.[1]

While this partner may on occasion be a close kinsman who is given a feast for some special reason, he often has a rather distant position in the exchange network of the donor, with whom commensality occurs only on rare occasions. Not only do feasts tend to extend in this way the range of individual social networks but they are especially apt to extend the range of social relations existing between villages. Feasts are often given by one village to another, thus leading to the establishment of at least one partnership between each household of the host village and each household of the guest village.

The explanation of pig sacrifices requires an elaboration of my model of exchange. The models used so far may be called *transactional*. One may distinguish between positive transactional cycles (in which the two sides exchange benefits mediated by gifts) and negative transactional cycles (in which the two sides exchange sanctions mediated by penalties). In addition one may construct *temporal* cycles, which may show the alternation between friendship and anger, offence and repentance, mortification and forgiveness. A violation of the exchange code will shift a relationship from a positive into a negative transactional cycle, while a reconciliation feast will restore positive reciprocity. The value of pig sacrifices lies in their power to set a relationship upon a course of positive exchanges where, previous to the sacrifice, the two sides were engaged in a mutually injurious exchange of sanctions.

This implies an assumption about the nature of social relations: namely that they cannot be described as intrinsically positive or negative. One cannot divide the Orokaiva social universe into concentric circles distinguishing between permanently friendly and permanently hostile groups. The most one may do (if one has data over a sufficient period) is to show that in the association between villages A and B the cycles of negative reciprocity have been relatively short while between villages A and C they have been relatively long. In this sense one may call B a 'friendly' and C a 'hostile' village, and it may be expected that inter-village feasts, in which pig sacrifices figure, will be more frequent between A and B than between A and C.

This conceptualisation is not based on my own private theory of sociality, but on the Orokaiva expressed belief that strife is a 'natural', i.e. *dema* established consequence of social relations. This belief implies that any relationship will tend to alternate between positive and negative cycles, primary kin relationships not excepted. In *original time*, we find only positive cycles of reciprocity; strife periodically engenders negative cycles, while pig sacrifices lead to the periodic restoration of positive reciprocity.

2. *The Wild Pig: Marauder*

To the Orokaiva the wild pig is above all a troublesome enemy, as it attacks taro crops in gardens and is liable to kill an unwary hunter. It lives in the jungle where it is believed that ghosts (*sovai*) may enter its body. A pig inhabited by a *sovai* is especially dangerous and harmful to man. The ontology of the pig is explained in a series of myths of which the following, recorded by Williams, states its message most clearly:

pig-lending becomes a simulation, on a minor scale, of the customs of marriage exchange, where a reciprocating pair of groups send back and forth a female marriage partner at intervals of one generation.

This assimilation of domesticated pigs to human members of exchanging social groups is emphasised by much customary behaviour towards these pigs. This behaviour goes beyond co-residence in the same house and the use of kinship terms of reference, but extends to strict taboos of wide range prohibiting the eating of domestic pigs by their rearers.

4. *Wild Pigs as Victims*

Williams (1930) describes in detail the techniques that are, or were, used for the hunting of pigs: the use of spears, pig-traps, and the collective burning of *kunai* grass to drive pigs towards their pursuers. I myself witnessed such a burn, in which three villages participated as owners of the burnt-over land (Inonda, Urio, Musou) as well as some hunters from Ajoro. The myths explaining the origin of the various techniques of hunting and of cooking the meat do not enlighten us greatly in the study of exchange, except to confirm a point already made in a previous chapter: the *dema* figure who is remembered as having 'given' a certain technique to mankind, is invariably described in the myth as the first *victim* of that technique. The ritual of killing is a very simple one: it consists in calling out one's clan name before striking the fatal blow. This is supposed to give the hunter the strength (*ivo*) he needs in order to kill. Both killer and victim are thus symbolically identified with a primal ancestor.

The killer of a wild pig is not bound by the same ritual restrictions as the killer of either a man or a domestic pig. Williams states that he found no rule prohibiting a man from eating his personal quarry. Nonetheless, I found that in practice the meat of the wild pig virtually always serves some purpose of exchange-sale, barter or the mediating of social relations. The two wild pigs killed by Inonda men during the hunt to which I have already referred will serve as an example.

Killer A presented his pig to his mother's brother who lives in Ajoro. Killer B presented his quarry to killer A, who is B's brother's wife's brother. A distributed most of the joints to men and women from Inonda (including B), and to two Ajoro men who had returned from the hunt empty-handed, but kept one joint. A's mother's brother kept part of the animal he had been given but distributed the rest of it to his Inonda relatives, including A., as well as several affines. In the end everyone in Inonda had received some meat, but sometimes this meat had gone through several hands. For instance, A's sister did not receive meat from the animal her brother had killed, but from the animal her brother received as a present. Her brother gave several joints to B and it was from one of these joints A's sister was able to eat, because B gave it to his own brother who was A's sister's husband.

After this set of circuitous transactions the fires were lit. I noticed that only some of the meat was boiled but that most of it was smoked for later use, In fact only a fraction of the two slaughtered pigs was eaten that night. The smoked meat was kept for a variety of transactions. In line with the modern trend, these included sale at the market, but there were also traditional prestations, e.g. a gift

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to a man who had lent an ornament for a recent ceremony. I was told that meat is sometimes kept for 'months' so it can be offered at a feast or used to discharge an obligation. The housewife smokes the meat over the fire every day so that, after a while, it becomes very 'strong'; the 'stronger' it is, the better.

While the economic motivation in the final disposal of the joints is plain enough, it is less easy to understand the elaborate exchanges immediately following the killing. There are no taboos that could explain why these exchanges were made. One might, of course, account for the whole series of gifts in the same way as I accounted for the taro gifts made between close associates: as a means of maintaining a quasi-commensal kind of social relationship. But such an explanation obscures an important difference between gifts of taro and pig meat, namely that gift taro is usually only a small part of the harvest, whereas it appears to be regular practice (even though not supported by taboo) to give away *all* the meat of a pig one has killed. There is a strong, empirically demonstrated, preference for eating pork that has been *given* rather than pork that has been personally killed.

The essential difference between taro and pork, as perceived by the Orokaiva, has already been discussed in a previous chapter. The difference is that taro is regarded as a staple food to keep men alive, whereas pork is regarded as a food of special power enabling men to succeed in tasks of great difficulty, in which success is always precarious. Pork has a special power or *ivo*. The reality of this belief is obvious from field observation. Meat-eating arouses in the Orokaiva a mood of extraordinary festivity and gaiety. After meat, he shows an exuberance and excitement Westerners display only when they have drunk a good deal or are 'turned on' by mild drugs. While one can think of biochemical causes for the Orokaiva behaviour, they explain this excitement themselves by referring to the *ivo* or spiritual qualities of meat.

These beliefs do not, in themselves, explain why it is considered better for meat to be given rather than consumed by the killer. They do, however, carry us back to the myth – already considered in detail – by which Orokaiva explain the origin of human *ivo*. *Ivo* was personified in Pig-man Totoima until his son slew him and cut his body into pieces. These joints, shared out among men, made the people multiply so that men are now spread throughout the world. The important point to note in this myth is that *ivo* did not come from the mere eating of the meat, but from the sharing out, following by the eating. If *ivo* is to be attained, it has to be through the re-enactment of the myth, which means not only the eating but also the sharing out. This sharing out is always done by cutting a pig into the very same joints as those into which the dead Totoima was dissected. Hence pork – whether derived from a wild or a domesticated pig – is magically most effective if it is a gift.

5. *Domesticated Pig as Victim*

Pig meat provided at the more important ceremonies of the Orokaiva comes far more frequently from domesticated than from wild pig. One reason for this is obviously practical: the more important ceremonies require very intricate planning in many spheres. The meat supply, which is a crucial requirement for such ceremonies, cannot be left to chance, though wild pork can usually serve to

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successfully cultivated that land, and at the same time no doubt with *dema* figures who instituted agriculture. But most sacrifices have to do with social relations that are either being entered into or that are being restored after a period of hostility. In all such cases the sacrificed pig serves as a gift object to the persons whose friendship is being sought. These persons may be clansmen, uterine kin, affines, bond-friends, trading partners, or persons who have rendered important ritual services.

An exhaustive list of examples of such sacrifices, very often involving only one pig and a rather minor ceremony, cannot be given. If a person has broken off social relations with a close relative in anger, by showing this relative his plant emblem, then relations can be restored only if the angry man is persuaded to 'throw his plant emblem away'. If he does this, the person to whom the plant emblem has been shown will sacrifice a pig. Again, if a man feels that he has neglected a fellow clansman for an unduly long time, he will end the estrangement by offering up a pig. A pig may be sacrificed to mark any reconciliation after a quarrel. The sacrificer in such a case appears to admit his own guilt and to restore a wrong done to the other person. Very often such a reconciliation follows a misfortune attributed to sorcery. The medicine man will determine, if the sufferer does not already know, who has caused the sorcery to be performed. It is then considered highly important to arrange a reconciliation with the person responsible for the sorcery. This person is not infrequently a close relative, such as a father's sister or mother's sister. The sufferer will offer up a pig if the dangerous relative is willing to forgive and forget. Sacrifices are also required when a person has violated a taboo, e.g. quarrelled in the presence of a cross-cousin or affine. In all such cases a feast will be held at which the wronged person receives the sacrificial beast.

The same pattern may be found in the larger ceremonies. I shall show in a later chapter that the various prestations rendered between affines can be viewed as propitiatory gifts made to allay anger at the wrong done by the other party. This is certainly true for the gifts made on various occasions by the husband, the husband's sister, etc. to the wife's relatives. Feasts given on the occasion of peace-making, or on other occasions where whole villages are invited can likewise be shown to have as their prime purpose the ending of strife. In all such cases the sacrifice of pigs is preliminary to their utilisation for the mediation of social exchange.

This pattern does not appear quite consistent with the communion model of sacrifice. Not only is there no rule that the offerers of the sacrifice should eat of the victim; on the contrary, we shall see that they are strictly forbidden to eat of it. The guests carry all the meat away with them and distribute it among their own group. One almost feels that the expiatory model might be applicable: the offerers of the sacrifice define themselves as offenders, they expiate their wrong-doing by sacrifice, the flesh of the victim becomes taboo to them.

The contradiction disappears if we regard communion with the god not purely as the ultimate end of sacrifice but also (and simultaneously) as the means to the mediation of a social relationship. I am suggesting that the Orokaiva believe that the killing and offering of a pig is not *in itself* sufficient to initiate or restore a social relationship: it is also necessary to make the offering in a properly ritual manner. The ritual involves the establishment of communion

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with divine beings. One might say with equal truth that the purpose of communion is expiation and that the purpose of expiation is communion. The transaction may be expressed in the following diagram:

MODEL 23



In this model the object of exchange is clearly expiation. Expiation is mediated by a ritual feast through which all participants identify themselves with beings of primal time and therefore with a period when strife had not become established. This identification is established in the first place by the offender's group which makes the sacrifice. It induces the offended party to participate in the feast and thereby signal its willingness, at least in principle, to suspend hostilities. The purpose of identification is therefore the expiation of offences.

In order to account for the rule that the meat is carried away by the offended party and that it is taboo to the offenders, we need to construct a second diagram, as follows:

MODEL 24



In this model the object of exchange is *ivo* which each group confers upon the other. The exchange is mediated by a pig sacrifice which, according to the Totoima myth, effectively bestows *ivo* upon the guests, *provided* that they carry the meat away with them, and also upon the hosts, *provided* that the guests remove the debilitating influence of any deleterious magic they may have directed at the hosts at an earlier time. One may say here that the purpose of

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sacrifice is a communion, as the obtaining of *ivo* is ultimately dependent upon an effective identification of man with the power-conferring ancestors.

Models 23 and 24 may be reduced to a single one which shows the essence of the whole transaction:

MODEL 25



This model, which is on a more abstract level than the previous two, states that two parties standing in a relation of social opposition can establish or restore friendly association with one another through the *mediation* of *ivo* (the source of *ivo* being the pig sacrifices). This is the essential equation of social exchange. *Ivo* cannot be obtained by the offerers of sacrifice acting alone, but it is necessary and sufficient for efficacy if two parties participate, one in the role of offerer and another in the role of recipient. The roles of 'offender' and 'offended' are ritual roles in which the actual amount of guilt or shame felt varies widely according to circumstances. The assumption of such roles is made necessary because strife has a continuously debilitating effect on man's *ivo*. Like many other peoples (viz. Monica Wilson 1952: 99–112; 1959: 161, 165, 217; Burridge 1969), the Orokaiva believe that 'anger in the heart' weakens the man who feels it. But the Orokaiva emphasise even more the obligation of the offender to assuage that anger, however caused. Actual misfortunes are mostly explained by anger existing in someone else's heart. The guilty person is deemed to be he who, after being made aware of this anger, does nothing to remove it. If the angry person uses sorcery or does some other harm it is not he but the victim of retribution who should feel guilty. The oozing away of *ivo* as a result of strife can be reversed by the holding of pig-feasts at which the host goes through a ritual which contains elements of both communion and expiation, but which essentially serves the mediation of social exchange.

I shall now test the usefulness of this model by using it to account for some empirical facts related to Orokaiva pig sacrifice. I shall discuss, because of the relative wealth of available material, the sacrifices made at inter-village feasts at the time of the main harvest. I shall also show how gifts made between affines may be interpreted with the help of the model.

6. *Expiation and Communion in Feasting*

The decision to hold a feast might arise in two ways. First, there might be an urgent need to offer the feast to a specific outside group, e.g. to make peace, or return a feast to which the group had been invited. Secondly, there might be a

574 628 721 728 could not help noticing the connection between the reconciliation and the simultaneous fear of sorcery to which I have already referred. But perhaps neither historical explanation is necessary.

It seems clear from Williams' evidence and from the little I could reconstruct in 1966 that Orokaiva history had been one long sequence of hostilities and reconciliations. The reasons for the reconciliations were various: the legalising of marriages after abductions, the expediency of forming alliances with old enemies when faced with the threat of new enemies, a desire for peace after some Pyrrhic victories, and so on. On the level of myth we find the same message: the permanent state of *isoro* was interrupted by periodic feasts (see model 1). The series starts, according to myth, with a state of primordial peace. This is followed by *isoro, peka, isoro* in permanent alternation. We may represent the total pattern by the series of congruent ellipses drawn on parallel planes directly above one another (see Model 27).

I have presented transactions in historical time by a series of four transactions, the first and last of which are purely exchanges of penalties. Cycle 2 represents an agreement between two opponents to cease warfare and make peace (*peka*). This cycle would normally start with a message, sent by the original aggressor, that he is ready to make amends. This message would be followed by a visit from the other party to the aggressor, when the latter would promise to hold a feast. A customary practice at such a meeting was for the aggressor to plant a cordiline (*poponda*) in evidence of this promise. The aggressor would then arrange a pig sacrifice.

Cycle 3 would be marked by peace (*peka*). The victim of the original aggression would give a return feast which was probably obligatory. If the basic end of pig sacrifice were communion or expiation, no return feast would be necessary, but as we have found the basic end to be the establishment or restoration of social relations, on a basis of equality, there must be a balance of prestations. Each side must sacrifice pigs; each side must dance for the other; each side must dispel black magic from the gardens of the other. Each side must expiate past offences and each side must extend forgiveness. But the model shows that such reconciliation is not expected to be more than temporary although, of course, friendship between villages can sometimes be maintained for protracted periods and there is no rule against holding feasts before a quarrel has reached deadly proportions.

571 602 578 754 The model applies not only to inter-village relations but to all social relations in general, consanguineal and affinal relations included. Quarrels between consanguines differ only in their relatively greater reluctance to resort to an exchange of penalties and greater readiness to settle a quarrel before it has gone too far. But here a great deal is said to depend on the type of kin relationship holding between the quarrelling parties. A father or mother will rarely use sorcery or other harmful measures against his or her children. Certainly they will not do so until they have, in the course of the quarrel, broken off social relations by showing their plant emblem. Usually a quarrel does not go beyond the breaking off of relations, but if further unpleasantness should occur and if the person who has caused anger is experiencing some misfortune, sorcery will at once be suspected. The same is true in case of conflict with the father's or the mother's brother, though the showing of the plant emblem does not, in such

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571 602 518 754 conflict, necessarily precede recourse to sorcery. It is believed, however, that such relatives will not usually carry their resentment too far. As soon as the afflicted person makes his apologies and shows himself ready to make a pig sacrifice, such sorcery will normally case. The same applies to the father's sister, though she has to be watched more carefully than the others, as she is very quick to resent neglect and seek retribution. She will be restrained, however, by the deep love she is expected to bear for her brother, so that she may be expected to agree fairly easily to a settlement. It is thought that mother's sisters are more dangerous as their bonds of family loyalty are much weaker. All these relatives [431] may cause disease, failure of gardens, bad luck in hunting, etc. All the relationships give rise to the same type of positive and negative reciprocity cycles: if proper prestations are made from time to time, positive reciprocity is maintained, but neglect over a long period will create anger and a negative reciprocity cycle.[5]

In the case of certain close relationships, restraint in acts of negative reciprocity does not arise from any rules limiting the expression of anger, but rather from the existence of other close social relationships which would be threatened if the expression of anger went too far. Thus a mother's brother would be restrained in wreaking revenge upon his nephew by the risk of offending his sister if the revenge were excessive. It is hard to illustrate these principles of exchange with concrete evidence, as I do not know of any actual harm being done between relatives. I know only that misfortunes which I would ascribe to natural causes tend to be explained by sorcery on the part of a neglected relative, and that the neglected relative then asks for or receives a pig or other animal.

571 579 602 583 Prestations between affines have a similar explanation, though the pattern of hostile action and retaliation between affines is somewhat different. The first hostile action in the series tends to be the abduction of a woman for purposes of marriage. This is defined as a hostile act directed against the woman's kin group. The girl's parents look for her and show considerable fury when they find her, wreaking havoc in the village of the abductor. One may say that this is the first cycle of exchange in an affinal relationship and it is totally negative. The abductor's kin group offers a present of ornaments called *sovu hambo*, and promises a bridewealth of acceptable proportions in return for which the bride's parents depart in peace.

It should be noted that, though this second cycle contains an exchange of positive (rather than negative) objects of mediation, the bridegroom's people remain in the position of debtors, while the bride's parents continue to harbour their anger. All they have agreed to is the continued residence of the bride with the bridegroom's people, pending a satisfactory settlement. The third cycle is constituted by the payment of bridewealth, including pig sacrifices, on one side, and the transfer of the usual conjugal rights, including the right to the bride's offspring, by the bride's kin group. On the level of social exchange, however, there is still no exchange in benefits. The relationship remains one between creditor and debtor, as the bridewealth does not wipe out the anger of the bride's parents nor expiate the offence of abduction. This point will be explained further in the chapter on marriage.

It suffices to say at this stage that pig sacrifices made by the bridegroom and

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his family are a necessary part of the process of assuaging the affinal family's anger. However, such one-sided payments do not in themselves set up a social relationship between affines among the Orokaiva. During this whole first phase of the marriage, the strictest affinal taboos are maintained, prohibiting, for instance, commensality between son-in-law and parents-in-law and their close kin. For social relations to begin, it is necessary for the bride's mother to rear a pig for sacrifice to the bridegroom. Unless she does this the son-in-law feels too 'ashamed' of the humiliations he has been through and of the anger shown to him for social relations to be possible. This sacrifice, too, has therefore an element of expiation. After this sacrifice, the taboos are relaxed and the mother-in-law attends a feast at which she *pretends* to eat. Ruth Craig (1969:189), who describes a similar pattern among the Telefolmin of the New Guinea Highlands, comments cogently: 'The second transaction, the return payment, initiates the affinal relationship and emphasises its chief characteristic, friendly reciprocity . . . The relationship starts as one of equality.' It is thus clear that model 27 provides an explanation not only of inter-village feasts and consanguineal relations, but also of the establishment of affinal relationships. On the social plane pig-sacrifice establishes positive reciprocity, while on the magico-religious plane it generates *ivo* for the participants. Reciprocity and *ivo* are thus homologous notions on different levels of conceptualisation.

REFERENCES

1 Durkheim wrote that a sacrifice is composed of two essential elements: an act of communion and an act of oblation (1961: 384). He distinguished sharply between representative or commemorative rites and piacular rites, according to the prevailing mood. The former are performed in a state of confidence and joy, the latter in a state of sadness, arising out of misfortune, evil omens, sorrow or fear (*ibid.* 434–5). Evans-Pritchard (1956:275) made a somewhat similar distinction, though perhaps a less subjective one, between 'communion' (involving a desire to be close to God) and 'piaculum' (involving a desire to keep God away or get rid of him).

The phenomena described in this work, though aberrant from the viewpoint of the Durkeimian and Evans-Pritchard models, are fairly widespread in Melanesia. For instance, Lane, describing pig sacrifices on South Pentecost, points out (1) that sacrificer and sacrificed pig merge and share identity; (2) that the meaning of the offerings is 'clarified by reference to the way in which a special formal friendship is instituted between two men' (1965: 267). The Mae Enga sacrifice pigs to a ghost when that ghost is suspected of causing misfortunes. But half or more of the meat, sometimes all of it, goes to maternal kinsmen as the ghost is always considered to belong to the uterine line (Meggitt 1965*b*: 112–3). Elements of communion and piaculum are both present, but also a need to influence critical social relationships.

2 For a detailed discussion of myths related to the differentiation of species, see Lévi-Strauss 1964.

3 For details on the effect of the Mount Lamington eruption on the Sangara tribe and the founding and development of Hohorita, see Schwimmer 1969.

4 A fuller discussion on Orokaiva leadership will be found in Reay 1953, Schwimmer 1967.

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5 This interpretation of Orokaiva sorcery appears to be largely supported by Lawrence and Meggitt who argue that in societies with 'stable social organisation' (among which they count the Orokaiva), sorcery accusations act 'both as an important medium for expressing enmity and as an excuse for initiating warfare, which is ultimately the most effective means of relieving feelings of aggression' (1965: 17). The authors appear to believe that sorcery can be explained along psychological lines as fulfilling a need for channelling aggression (*ibid.* 18). I find it hard to see how the specific facts of sorcery behaviour (and especially the transactional patterns described in these pages) can be explained in terms of universal needs. Sorcery is only one of many substitutes for physical aggression and all these substitutes, in one way or another, serve to maintain a relationship of negative reciprocity.

Accusations of sorcery probably have a cognitive as well as an effective 'function', for they imply an explanation of misfortunes for which no natural cause is known. Furthermore, such accusations turn misfortune into an object of mediation in (negative) social exchange. The assumption is made that the misfortune will continue until the relationship with the sorcerer is basically changed, either by his defeat or by reconciliation.

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CHAPTER VIII

COCONUT AND BETELNUT

1. *Theoretical Intermezzo*

We have discussed throughout this work the belief that crises in social relations are resolved by magic. In the last chapter we showed explicitly that this is the view expressed in the Orokaiva folk model of exchange (model 25). There are two implications in this folk model: that magical power (*ivo*) is required to establish social relations and that social relations have the effect of generating *ivo* for those who establish them. The objection that may be advanced against this approach is its subjectivity. One may call it a phenomenological approach, as it is based on *ego*'s experience of *alter*'s world as transcendant (see Schutz 1967: 312–29). One may also call it the approach of Marcel Mauss (1966), who explained exchange by a magical construction he called *hau*. It may be argued that it has some resemblance with Sartre's philosophy (1960), where the opposition between *ego* and *alter* is transcended by a 'dialectical process' or 'praxis'. Here again no interdependence of *ego* and *alter* is deemed to exist prior to a course of action inaugurated by *ego* and serving to transcend the opposition.

Against all these theories, Lévi-Strauss has argued that exchange is logically prior to giving, receiving and giving in return. In his theory, unconscious mental structures not only determine that man should order his universe by means of systems of binary oppositions, but also that these oppositions should be transcended by syntheses. Exchange, and any form of communication, is a synthesis where things are perceived simultaneously from the viewpoint of self and other and destined by nature to pass from the one to the other. The situation that they *belong to* the one or the other arises out of initial relational characteristics (Lévi-Strauss 1966: xlvi).

The evidence quoted for these unconscious mental structures is mainly linguistic: the Papuans and Melanesians have only one word for sale and purchase, lending and borrowing, which shows that contradictions between these terms must be illusory. If we survey the Orokaiva data reported in previous chapters, we notice that in general objects of mediation are similarly 'destined by nature' to pass from one partner to another. Meat, for instance, is magically effective only or predominantly if it is received as a gift. One may say that pigs are a family's gift-children: they are part of the family but it is their destiny to be given away. From birth, they may be said to 'belong' to some exchange partner. In fact, in my whole discussion on mediation, I stressed that the donor must be identified with the object of mediation and that, for the exchange relation to be effective, the recipient should also identify with it. I pointed out

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CHAPTER IX

ORNAMENTS

1. *Introduction*

Exchanges mediated by ornaments may be studied in very much the same way as those mediated by coconut and betelnut. This means that (1) ornaments may serve as symbols of identity; (2) this symbolic quality attached to ornaments makes them suitable to serve as objects of mediation.

A symbol of identity, in the sense intended here, is an object which, if shown or given to another person, reveals the identity of its owner. A plant emblem is, in this sense, a symbol of identity, as anyone who sees it lying on the path knows the identity of the person who put it there. More specifically, the finder of the plant emblem knows that the person who dropped it is a member of a specific group which has the right to use this emblem and which is identified with it. Identity, in this instance,[1] is not defined as attached to an individual but rather as attached to a class, and the individual who uses the plant emblem is stating his membership of that class. Furthermore, identity in this sense must always have been *received from* someone. Membership in a plant emblem group is conferred by a father or mother. It is not a gift but an automatic result of filiation. As such it is symbolic of the system of rules governing co-operation within the corporate group.

An ornament may be ceremonially conferred upon a person who will henceforth regard it, in the same sense, as a symbol of identity. The ornament is then called an *otohu*, a term to be defined later. It is worn by its owner and those who see it recognise it as a symbol of its owner's moral integrity. It indicates that the owner has pledged to act in accordance with a historically established behaviour model. Therefore, in this instance again, identity is not defined as attached to an individual but rather as attached to a class of persons who follow this behaviour model. Furthermore, again, identity in this sense must always have been received from someone. It is not conferred necessarily by the wearer's father, but may come from any other male consanguine (or even affine) of the ascending generation. It is not conferred automatically; there is no rule saying that it should be conferred and it is not conferred upon everyone. The *otohu* is, in fact, always a gift. As such it is symbolic of a pledge made by the wearer that he regards himself as bound by the system of rules governing exchange between other corporate groups and his own.

Although it is usual for persons to own more than one ornament, I have not heard of any owning more than one *otohu*. The *otohu* is distinguished from other ornaments (*hambo*) by the addition of some special feature which constitutes its mark of identity. *Otohu* are not given away except in special

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ceremonial circumstances, but *hambo* are freely exchanged between partners. All the characteristics already described of such objects of mediation as land, taro and pigs probably apply equally to *hambo*, though my evidence on this point is far less complete, due to the very large number of magical substances that enter into the construction of *hambo*. They are not, however, symbols of identity.

On a functional level, one may regard the *otohu* after the analogy of a membership badge to some association or even a credit card. It indicates to others that they can safely carry on transactions with the bearer. On a structural level, the two types of identity symbol – the plant emblem or *hae* and the *otohu* – constitute, in combination and in their interrelation, the reality of the entire Orokaiva social system. This system is dominated by two principles: corporate groups bound to a system of rules governing their co-operation and a system of exchange between corporate groups on which they depend for vital benefits. The *hae* symbolises membership of the corporate group whereas the *otohu* symbolises participation in the system of exchange. There are several significant symbolic contrasts: the *hae* is a natural object (usually a plant), never given or lent to anyone, deposited as a sign to members of the corporate group that corporate rights have been used by the depositor, but never openly shown except to signal anger felt towards members of the corporate group and a resolve to break the relationship. In contrast the *otohu* is a cultural object, lent to relatives who are entitled to wear it, but otherwise never deposited or transferred, and always shown conspicuously by the owner when he contemplates transactions outside the corporate group.

While a *hae* is transmitted automatically, the conferring of the *otohu* is an important ceremony that will be discussed in detail in this chapter. This discussion will be followed by a summary of the available evidence on the use of *hambo* (other than *otohu*) as objects of mediation in social exchange.

2. *The Nature of Otohu Ornaments*

Most ornaments are acquired by hunting, foraging, barter, purchase or inheritance. These may be regarded purely as decorations (*di* or *hambo*) and there are no restrictions on who may make or wear such ornaments, which are freely disposed of by barter or sale. The *otohu* is not distinguishable from other *hambo* except on the basis of specific knowledge of local practice. Some families have a particular shell which is their *otohu*, others may use a particular arrangement of hornbill beaks. Others again may have a special way of decorating armlets of white cuscus (*pauri*). There are many very beautiful and elaborate *hambo* which are not *otohu* and other much simpler ornaments which are *otohu*. Where large shells are *otohu* these are worn by themselves, on the chest or suspended on the side of the owner's betelnut bag. Other *otohu* are added to what would otherwise be an ordinary *hambo*: it is the addition of the *otohu* object which makes a *hambo* into an *otohu*.

In the earliest literature on the *otohu* it was regarded as an 'homicidal emblem'. Beaver (1920) reported that a man-slayer, having undergone some form of purification or exorcism, might at some convenient time receive his *otohu*. He gave two lists of objects that were supposedly so used, one for the coastal and central tribes (eight items) and one for the Wasida and trans-Kumusi

5: Schwimmer E-4,5 (1966-1967) 1973
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of the 'husband' who either gives a woman in exchange (direct marriage exchange) or else makes some kind of reparation for having deprived his exchange partner (generalised marriage exchange).

REFERENCES

1. Erikson, describing 'the beginnings of identity' in the adolescent, comes rather close to what I have in mind in this chapter: 'The emerging identity bridges the stages of childhood when the bodily self and the parental images are given their cultural connotation: and it bridges the stage of young adulthood, when a variety of social roles become available and, in fact, increasingly coercive.' (1963: 235).

2. A person who receives a token is referred to in this chapter as an 'initiate', as Williams makes it very clear the the bestowal of the token is not a necessary part of initiation, and comes after the ceremony which makes an 'inistion' into an 'initiate'.

3. I am using Beaver's spelling, as Beaver (1920) is the source for Williams' and my own information about *kortopo*, but Williams spells the word *kotopo*.

5: Schwimmer E-4,5 (1966-1967) 1973
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reciprocating pairs of groups in a state of pseudo-commensality. They share not only the land but also its products. The symbolic significance of taro, as set out in that chapter, accords with this theory. Symbolically, taro are children of the marriage of the donors; they are constantly being given away both inside and outside the *simbo* relationship.

On the other hand, the pig belongs essentially to the sphere of *dorobu* marriage, not only because pigs are always sacrificed on such occasions, but because they are the institutionalised means whereby a negative cycle of reciprocity can be made positive.

Again, the coconut-betelnut myth has not merely to do with marriage as the union of two partners or even families, but is a charter for the offering of these nuts on the graves of affines by a large group of survivors who gathered for a mortuary ceremony – a ceremony which often brought together a number of entire villages. The ritual celebrates (as the myth also indicates) the ideal of sister exchange marriage.

This brief summary shows the relationship of objects of mediation to social structure. Social structure, in the sense in which I am using the term, is most clearly articulated in the marriage system, though other systems (e.g. institutionalised hereditary friendship) may also provide important clues to the structure. If the study of objects of mediation provides no more than a manual of some Orokaiva magic, the social structure provides the ultimate rationale of this magic. The structure, as analysed in this chapter, has the objectivity of a mathematical formula. The living fabric of the society has a beauty which we can never ignore and which perhaps forms the *raison d'être* of much of our study. We find this living actuality in the magical processes whereby social relationships are established, maintained and broken. We find it in the pattern of alternation of friendship and enmity, in the unpredictability of the duration of any positive or negative cycle. Barnes (1962) came very close to recognising this pattern when he suggested that the difference between African and New Guinean models may be explained by the New Guinean preoccupation with *killing*. Certainly the Orokaiva world view is greatly preoccupied with killing.

Perhaps this is a price one pays for the orientation towards exchange: one must always be prepared to see a positive cycle of reciprocity break down and a negative one begin, often in a most violent manner. Clearly, the corporate group is not a concept which leads to a full understanding of the basic operation of such a culture. It is for this reason that I have attempted an analysis in which the marriage system is the key to the structure and the institutions arise out of the operation of exchange, structured according to magical formulae which are themselves moulded by the marriage system.

REFERENCES

1. Some discrepancies between Williams' terms and mine may be due to local differences or to cultural changes. It is possible that the modern prevalence of the multi-clan village has led to reduced use of the *simbo* category and to the dropping of the term *behere* between members of the same generation. Culture change may also account for the reduced use of self-reciprocal terms between alternate generations.

614 is the claim, however well founded, that this was part of the local ancestral land of men of their own clan.

The affirmation of the common territorial interest of the group of Jegase clansmen in the neighbourhood would occur only when we were proceeding with a series of enquiries both into the boundaries of the scattered parcels held by smaller groups or by individuals and into the source of their rights. This suggested that, in view of the frequency of individual transfer of parcels of land among non-agnates, the explicit assertion of the unity of the enduring group and its territory may be an ex post facto argument. This is both an affirmation of common grounds for legitimate land claims of individuals and lineages, irrespective of the actual origin of their rights, and also the most decisive means of differentiating clearly one parcel of land from adjacent holdings of members of other clans.

The appearance of a patrilineal ideology in this context might be expected of members of a loose-knit descent group with a territory interspersed with territories of other members of the local community in which an elaborate network of non-agnatic and affinal ties plays an important part in each individual's life. 571 602 It is by virtue of such interpersonal ties, hardly less than by shared membership of a local patrilineal group, that close face-to-face contacts and bonds of friendship are maintained, mutual [425] assistance is offered, temporary rights to land are exchanged and, [428] by these means, claims to inherit land are established in many circumstances.

d. Patterns of landholdings

614 There are 60 blocks altogether which are either wholly or partly made up by one or more of the parcels held by the sample A (138 acres in all). In general each block is held by members of a single clan branch but 3 are divided so men of each of the 2 sample groups hold sections. In other instances members of different clans and of other villages hold a contiguous section [613] of the named area but these were not measured. Eleven blocks were subdivided between 2 lineages of the same clan and just on half the total number of blocks contain internal boundaries between different householders in the lineage. No 2 householders are regularly associated with one another in the holding of rights in [613] the subdivided blocks.[1] The distribution of these and other parcels of the lineage land among its members is almost random.

[1] In one instance 2 men (who are brothers) held adjacent sections of several blocks but these sections represent only a small proportion (by area or number of parcels) of the landholdings of either man.

A. [See Category 601, p. 52--Analyst]

554 Only occasionally do his monetary aspirations appear openly to conflict with customarily defined Orokaiva behaviour. Two such cases may be instanced.

432 While the practice of 'marketing' pigmeat is becoming increasingly common among the inland Orokaiva, initially to 'strangers' by hawking around villages or selling it at Saiho market, it is also beginning to operate among kinsmen at the intra-village level. 'Marketing' normally follows the unpremeditated killing of a pig, as in the case of one having broken into a garden. Two cases occurred in Sivepe during the year, one organised by the village councillor and the other involving a pig of Linton's. While Linton shot the pig himself and decided to 'market', at the last moment he left the village and another member of Timumu clan cut it up and sold it, giving all the proceeds to Linton's mother.
[431] In a third case Linton had decided to distribute the legs as hande[1] but market the body. Again at the last moment he changed his mind and made hande with all the meat.

472 Linton faced a similar conflict between custom and cash in his hunting activities. As
224 the owner of a shotgun he did a great deal of hunting, particularly in the dry season, formulating a business arrangement with non-kinsmen from other villages whereby he would
● [571] hunt on their behalf if they provided the cartridges and a cash payment of 10c with each cartridge. In return he guaranteed a flying fox for each cartridge. By such a restriction of entrepreneurial activities to people outside the 'sympathy group'[2] an effective compromise is achieved between customary values and commercial aspirations, and individual security founded on reciprocal exchange among kindred is not impaired.

554 Linton's status in the community, and the diversity of his interests and loyalties, is manifested by his being the most active person in the sample.[3] With a mean activity week of 52.9 hours he distributes his efforts throughout the range of activities (with the exception of household and sickness which are predominantly the concern of women) leaving little time for informal socialising.

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1 Hande: a prestation where subsequent reciprocation is expected.

2 i.e. the group 'to which the individual feels he owes allegiance; he gives them his sympathy, and from them he expects to receive sympathy; and their limits are the limits of his intra-group morality' (Williams 1930:310). For a lengthy discussion of the concept see Williams 1930:308-36. See also Lawrence's discussion (1967:101-5) of the 'security circle', an analogous concept.

3 With the exception of the girl in full-time employment at Sasembata clinic.

181 In his discussion of Orokaiva morality, Williams (1930:322) states that 'The group...contents itself with two main requirements - (i) material plenty, and (ii) internal concord. ...each virtue implies agent and reagent'. Three 'moral factors' are identified as working positively towards the achievement of this ideal: industry (the manifestations of which have been treated in Part II), liberality and helpfulness. A concern for mutual aid operates among members of the 'sympathy group' and is therefore only effective over a socially and geographically restricted area. Being an acephalous society, it is based on a reciprocal system whereby a prestation voluntarily made carries with it certain obligations and expectations.

431 In traditional Orokaiva society several types of prestations were identified, according to the scale, circumstance and nature of the obligation incurred, and many of them are still practised, albeit often in an attenuated form. The most common is termed 437 osisa - the informal daily distribution of small quantities of cooked food within the village. No account is kept of the volume involved but equal participation by all households is expected, the only exceptions being the aged and the single men, with the latter being called upon to reciprocate with a labour service from time to time. Such distributions are primarily the women's responsibility. However the casual gifts of areca and lime, made by the men, fall within the same category.

796 The term hande, freely translated as 'generous', is applied more 574 specifically to ceremonial distributions and feasts organised by 431 the men.[1] They are normally characterised by the participation of agnates and affines from other villages and by the strict attention paid to the apportionment of gifts according to considerations of kinship, status and specific obligations being acknowledged.

626 Visoare are challenge feasts of an avowedly competitive and [578] hostile nature made in connection with unresolved disputes such as [574] encroachment on land, or the stealing and unauthorised killing of [614] pigs. They generally occur at the inter-, but neighbouring, clan level and incorporate the powerful sanction of shame for the individual or group challenged. The procedure is for the party levelling the initial accusation to hold a feast, invite the other, make a gift of food to them, and then challenge them publicly to reciprocate with a feast of equivalent scale. A failure to match it can only result in humiliation.

431 The type of gift made as a gesture of friendship or appreciation, 572 but not normally reciprocated, is known as umbare. Such gifts are 574

[1] See p.26 for a description of the circumstances under which feasts are arranged.

A,(See Category 574, p.26--Analysis)

Chapter 12

The two villages compared

437
184

(a) The form and content of exchanges

The data on exchanges are of a less comprehensive nature than those dealing with activity patterns. Hospitality, 'a cardinal virtue with the Orokaiva' (Williams 1930:37), has been disregarded as has a range of minor transactions, such as the loan of tools, temporary care of children, the casual movement of the lime gourd from hand to hand and much of the sharing of areca at informal gatherings. However, such exchanges replicate those of the more important goods and services dealt with, in terms of both their form and function.

[571]

There are only minor differences identifiable in the basic characteristics of exchange in the two villages. Each manifests a demand for cash that greatly exceeds the returns obtained from cash cropping, with the latter only one of several important sources of income. Nevertheless, the juxtaposition of monetary and non-monetary exchanges largely conforms to traditional concepts of morality where the principle of reciprocity operates within the 'sympathy group' and monetary transactions are effected, almost exclusively, with indigenes lying outside this group and with institutions located in the external sector of the economy. Thus a precarious, and probably only temporary, compromise has been achieved in which group solidarity and individual commercial aspirations each operate within socially and geographically identifiable contexts. The decision of the senior member of the largest Jegase lineage to 'market' pigmeat among villagers, and Linton's own dilemmas in the matter clearly demonstrate the vulnerability of the Orokaiva ideal of reciprocity in the face of progressive commercialisation of their economy.

However, to make a strict division between monetary and non-monetary exchanges can be misleading for, not only do specific goods and services marginally overlap the two categories, but many of the latter exchanges are not unlike the former in character. The principle of reciprocity underlies them all, although the system does not require that like be exchanged for like, and one type of goods is often reciprocated by another or goods by

241 422 592 423 Later again, in line with an agricultural officer's recommendation, he encouraged each son to plant individually. He proposes that his gardens should be inherited by his sons jointly, with work and profits being shared by them.

428 B's bachelor brother speaks of the cash crops as B's even though both have worked on them equally together, but says that B 'looks after' financial and other matters on his behalf. Whichever of them dies first the other will inherit, but when both die the assets will be inherited by B's only surviving son, a former teacher who shares no interest in cash-cropping.

C claims sole rights to his plantation on the ground that he has compensated his brothers for their help with gifts and by assisting them to establish their own cash crops. There is reason to believe, however, that if C dies before his children are adult, his brothers will probably claim a share. Some other people of [518] C's village regard the plantation as belonging to several sub-clans jointly and their challenge to his rights was a real threat until he was issued a formal lease.

422 24 464 [654] D has no younger brothers, but he did have a government loan (though it was not intended for hiring labour). With the loan and gross profits from his store (see p.11 ff.) he has hired a total of seven workers at various times. As with the labour occasionally hired by the other entrepreneurs, they have all left within a few months of engagement. The employers give no adequate explanation for this and, as I have been unable to contact the former employees, the reasons can only be postulated. In some cases the employer has had insufficient money to pay them but this has not always been the case. Almost all employees have come from twenty to a hundred miles away and most are from different language and culture groups from the employing entrepreneurs. This may well [466] be due to the fact that the employer-employee relationship, with its clear-cut subordination, has no traditional precedent and is [591] incompatible with Orokaiva notions of appropriate interpersonal relationships. New relationships of this kind are probably easier to establish with strangers and outside one's own community.

Since his attempts to engage permanent paid labour were not [62] successful, in recent years A has frequently arranged for the [602] people within his hamlet (his children, his brothers and their children, two father's brother's sons and all their spouses) to undertake short-term tasks such as clearing or harvesting. At the end of each task he compensates them in cash or store goods. None of the others has developed this sort of arrangement.

422 654 The entrepreneurs have all benefited from assistance given by government officers. Before the war A marketed his coffee through the government and he speaks of the Resident Magistrate assisting him to import and install a coffee machine and open a bank account.

463 472 Seniority of birth. This seemed to be of positive significance for entrepreneurs who based their operations on cash-cropping (Crocombe 1967:5). It may possibly be of negative significance for traders. Three of the four first-born sons fall into the least successful category and the fourth into the middle category.

[462] Sex. All those in the sample are men with the exception of L, who is the most successful of all. Her elder brothers were killed in the Mt Lamington eruption and she says she is regarded by her father as a son in many respects.

[614] [571] Traditional leadership roles. The only position of traditional leadership recognised today is that of sub-clan head. Only one of the entrepreneurs in the sample (E) was a sub-clan head, one was the son of a sub-clan head and in other cases the relationship was more distant. As most sub-clans contain only about two to ten men, sub-clan leadership seems clearly to give no advantage in trading. It may possibly be an inhibiting factor but we have no evidence on this point.

463 472 571 621 Non-traditional leadership roles. It is to be expected that Orokaiva entrepreneurs will hold responsible and respected positions in their community. The table below shows a positive correlation between entrepreneurial activity and elective community leadership roles. Seven of the twelve subjects hold such leadership roles. A local government councillor represents over 200 people (and one is president of a council serving about 10,000 people). The co-operative chairmen are elected by some hundreds of people and a church councillor represents about a hundred people.

Table 6

Elected positions of responsibility in the community

Elected position of responsibility	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J*	K	L
Local government councillor	'	'			'		'		'			'
Church councillor					'	'						
Chairman of Co-operative					'		'					
President of Women's Club												'
Total	1	1	-	-	3	1	2	-	1	-	-	2

* J has been invited to become chairman of the local co-operative store which he helped to establish.

Subject E, the only clan head in the sample, holds important elective posts as local government councillor, church president, and chairman of a co-operative society. He had also previously held paid positions carrying responsibility and authority and requiring initiative.

463 An examination of whether elective positions of responsibility
472 were held before or after entrepreneurial activities commenced
571 suggests that persons with leadership qualities already recognised
621 by the community are more likely to engage in such activities.

Table 7

Time relation between entrepreneurial activity and elected position

Time elected	A	B	E	F	G	I	J	L
Before trade store opened	'	'	'	?	'	?		'
After trade store opened							'*	

* J has been invited to become chairman of the local co-operative store which he helped to establish.

The holding of an elective position of responsibility concomitantly with carrying on entrepreneurial activities is not necessarily an advantage to the entrepreneur. Several of the subjects had found that their community duties were time-consuming and interfered with their trading activities.

463 Household composition. It is impossible to say whether a large
472 household tends to inhibit trading success but the data suggest that
592 it may.

Group I subjects averaged 6.5 persons per household, group II, 5.75 persons and group III, 5.25 persons.

Many entrepreneurs complained that relatives, particularly older ones, took food and other items from the stores without payment but we have no measured data on this point.

Table 8

Size of household

A	8	E	5	I	10
B	3	F	4	J	3
C	10	G	5	K	6
D	5	H	9	L	2
Average	6.5		5.75		5.25

463 Residence in or out of village. In traditional Orokaiva society
472 members of a village or clan were bound together by a complex system
602 of kinship ties and obligations (Williams 1930:335). Subsistence
[366] derives from the land and social security from the fulfilment of obligatory ties which bring reciprocal returns in times of sickness,

Even those entrepreneurs who engaged relatives were not in favour of doing so, and none hired unrelated members of the same village. The traditional complex of relationships within the village tends to undermine the authority of a local employer, and this makes it difficult for entrepreneurs to enforce their orders. Wherever possible, they hire workers whose contact with the village in which the crop or store is located is minimal. They are usually hired as short-term casual labour on cash crops and are rarely employed in the stores. The employer-employee relationship has no traditional precedent and entrepreneurs try to follow their conception of a European model.

463 472 466 464 591 602 [177]

Table 11

No. of co-operating adult male kin

A	1	E	4	I	2
B	1	F	1	J	2
C	3	G	4	K	3
D	4	H	2	L	3
Average	2.25		2.75		2.5

Table 12

Labour engaged by entrepreneurs to help with cash crops

463 472 464 466 465

Entrepreneur	Labour: Extended family or siblings No.	Period	Payment	Non-relatives from same village	Non-relatives from difference village No.	Period	Payment
A	-			-	1 1	1 month 2 months	$3/month and food - do -
B	-			-	-		
C	3	occasional	50c per week	-	-		
D	4	6 months establishing	food	-	-		
E	4	occasional	food and clothing	-	4	establishment	$4 per fortnight
F	-	previous casual help	food, etc.	-	-		
G	4	occasional	store goods, food and pigs	-	-		
H	-			-	1 1	1 month 3 months	$4 per month
I	2	occasional	food and clothing	-	-		
J	1	regular	food, no cash yet	-	-		
K	2	occasional	food, etc.	-	1	occasional	$1.50 per fortnight
L	2	short period	$2.50 per week	used to employ 3. Abandoned as unsatisfactory.	3	occasional	$2.50 per week

657 been at Ombi-Tara, in favour of briefer parties which distract less
423 from market oriented activities.[1]

182 There was verbal evidence at Ombi-Tara of further rejection of
[829] old customs since the introduction of tenure conversion. Informants often suggested that conversion marks the beginning of a new life - 'Before we were not using our land well but now we are changing everything and we will live better'. Several previous innovations in the Northern District have been greeted in like fashion (see Belshaw 1951:249, and Crocombe 1964a:29-32).

[622] Leadership in the traditional societies of Papua-New Guinea is
[554] generally not inherited but achieved through personal excellence in economic and political organisation and the main activities of the society including a knowledge of land tenure arrangements. It
[614] was decided by the members of the Musu clan that their clan leader was too old to understand and adapt to the new land system. His son was not considered clever enough to succeed him and eventually the thirty-five year old son of the leader's brother was chosen as successor.

[621] The introduction of tenure changes tends to favour younger men who no longer need to defer to their elders for cash crop land. Tenure conversion at Ombi-Tara may also affect the balance of 'informal' authority in the area by altering the balance of land rights. Before conversion some individuals had rights to consider-
[556] ably larger areas of land than others. This was of some significance in determining status and prestige. Since conversion, each individual has rights to twenty acres of land. The long-term effect of this equalisation on social organisation and informal status and prestige systems may be of some significance.

[614] The functions of the clan leader are little changed by the new
[627] tenure system. As before, he has no jurisdiction over land held by individuals. He previously had limited authority to intervene if one man planted on another's land without permission and under the new system can prevent one man planting behind another's block. He is charged with preventing people from other clans or other areas planting on his clan's land in much the same way as before tenure conversion, with the difference that now his jurisdiction in this matter applies only to the clan land outside the blocks.

Obligations

571 Mutual assistance and mutual obligation patterns provide a system of social security, a form of institutional safeguard

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[1] Similar changes have been reported in another Orokaiva area by Crocombe (1966:71-2) and Hogbin (1966:81-3).

571 against sickness, crop failure and other catastrophes. The mutual
[602] obligation system which operates among kinsmen 'acts as a man's
[182] trade union, his friendly or benefit society, his slate club and his orphanage; it takes the place for him of health insurance, and if needs be provides for his funeral' (Lawrence 1964:34).

121 If it is hoped to set up individual farmers independent of their kinsmen some substitute must be found for the traditional method of social insurance. For as Fisk (1961:777) has pointed out, 'in an underdeveloped country...ready and prompt access to assistance in time of need is a variable of considerable importance to the settler'. Attempts to break down traditional obligation patterns by individualisation of tenure have often met with little success. In Egypt (see Gadalla 1962:80) and in various parts of the Pacific (Crocombe 1964b:127 and 1965:15) land registration schemes designed to result in individual tenure have failed to achieve individual ownership and use of land.

476 There are indications that traditional obligation patterns may
571 be continuing at Ombi-Tara since tenure conversion was introduced.
178 Blocks were cleared by kin groups in accordance with custom. Two
[689] men mentioned that there had been an arrangement whereby if a person worked on the block of another man but the second man did not reciprocate, he would have to pay the first man 80 cents. However, both people said that no one had had to pay it. Two men who were working for wages on road maintenance near Ombi village bought food from the nearby store for those who helped clear their blocks. Five people claimed that they had helped clear other people's blocks but had not received any assistance in return. Everyone who was questioned said that no new obligations had been established by the process of clearing but this may be open to question.

423 It has already been mentioned that conversion involved substan-
657 tial redistribution and equalisation of right holdings. Whether obligation to the 'donors' will be established as a result is a matter for future observation.

The blocks of three of the four absentee blockholders were being cleared and planted by kinsmen. The block of the fourth absentee had not been cleared at the time of our stay. It is likely that some obligations will be established by this assistance.

Two families are living in houses constructed on the block of another man; and several people have cocoa, coffee or bush rubber trees growing on blocks held by other people. These situations are discussed on p.29 below.A

The Ombi man who moved to his block to protect his taro from the sorcery of another villager replanted some of his taro on the block of a kinsman, for further protection. This was the only reported case of a person planting crops on the block of another

A [See Category 425--Analyst]

January 1951. The failure of this scheme emphasises the important role of the individual leader in any innovation in New Guinea.

An important modification to the residential pattern resulted from the Agricultural Co-operative. Not only was co-operation practised in the gardens but co-operative theory was preached as a Christian ideal in the churches and taught in the schools and training colleges of the Anglican Mission. The teachers emphasised the practical advantages of living in a large community; for example, co-operative labour could be easily organized, social clubs could function more readily and school, church, and hospital would be more readily accessible to the majority. Most Yega accepted this view and, during 1953, many of them rebuilt their houses in a planned rectangular village, Beporo, close to the mission station (Figs. 4, 12). Here there was a tendency for the household heads of each clan to group their dwellings together and to maintain the same inter-clan relationships as had existed in the smaller villages. Nevertheless, there was a breakdown in the previously tight social control over the location of dwellings. Some men exercised this freedom by building away from their clansmen but near to their wives' kin and in some instances even sharing a dwelling with them.

Since 1960, seven new inland villages have been established along the road leading from Gona mission to the town of Popondetta. This movement inland from the coast was initiated by the development of a cocoa-planting project which is without doubt the most significant change in land use to have occurred yet. In 1960 the old wartime road between Gona and Popondetta (actually the last stage of the Kokoda Trail) was re-opened by the efforts of the Anglican missionary living at Gona. It gave access to land at Ononda which in the opinion of the District Agricultural Officer (DAO) was suitable for cocoa. As the Yega had previously made enquiries about planting cocoa, the DAO now advised them to clear a large area of rain forest and plant their cocoa in a continuous strip, which would then be sub-divided into individual blocks, rather than in the small scattered plots which is the usual pattern of indigenous cash crop plantings.

[P.15-A]

19: Schwimmer E-5 (1966-1970) 1979 OJ23 Orokaiva OJ23

We have to establish values for X, Y, C for each episode, i.e. for each prestation. Under 'social behaviour patterning rules', we would need to treat formal and contextual social relations between classes of actors as contexts because a quite different 'meaning' needs to be attached to a prestation according to whether it is made between, for instance, cross-cousins, affines, feasting partners or hereditary friends. (For the Orokaiva, these differences are glossed in Schwimmer 1974.)

We could not retain the otherwise very useful class of 'convertibility rules', first established by Firth (1939), because prestations of taro, yam, areca nuts, pig, different types of ornaments etc. may follow varying 'rules of syntax'. Even if such objects belong to the same 'sphere of exchange', their convertibility as signifiers can never be assumed on the basis of a functional classification but must each time be established by specific semiotic investigation.

To give another example, in an investigation of daily intra-village taro prestations among Orokaiva I found that the meaning of the gifts was systematically affected by their frequency (chronemic rule) and by the distance between donor's and recipient's residences (topological rule). Subtle nuances in social distance could thus be signified.

These examples give some idea of the kind of rigour the semiotic analysis of exchange demands. While most kinds of constitutive rules to be discovered in exchange systems fall into the standard types enumerated by Bouissac, there are two kinds that may be specific to ritualised prestations. These need to be briefly presented. The first kind may be called 'equivalence rules', and specifies the conditions under which two patently different objects will be deemed to be 'equivalent' in the sense that one is fair (balanced) exchange for the other. The term is due to Daniel de Coppet (1968) who gives examples, taken from Malaita ethnography, that show very clearly that the equivalence here is not inherent in the objects exchanged but purely in the representations Malaitans have about what they stand for.

If we use the same symbols as before for constitutive rules, and write a transaction as two prestations P1 and P2, and if

P1 = X1 stands for Y1 in context C
P2 = X2 stands for Y2 in context C

then P1 and P2 are equivalent if the recipient in P2 considers them to be so. Where social relations between exchange partners are, ritually speaking, symmetrical, equivalence will normally be restored by a return gift of objects of the same kind, the same quantity, the same quality. The need for writing equivalence rules arises where role attributes or formal capacities are complementary, and where X1, X2 cannot be objects of the same kind so that their equivalence must be established by a cultural rule. The most famous example is the *mwali*/*soulava* exchange in the *kula*. Malinowski wrote (1922: 356) that the two ornaments are 'equivalent' if of the same quality. Also, 'the armshells are conceived as a female principle and the necklaces as the male.' Moreover, speaking metaphorically of Dobuans (recipients of 'female' *mwali* armshells), Trobrianders said 'they are women'. We may therefore in this case

CHAPTER III: Social Environment

Section 1: Opportunity for Contact with Outsiders

The experience of the eruption led to outside contacts that would not otherwise have occurred. These outside contacts obviously were among the basic causes of social changes arising out of the eruption. In the present study, it is by no means easy to distinguish between outside contacts which arose out of the eruption, directly or indirectly, and those which existed prior to the eruption or were the result of social changes unconnected with the eruption. But before we can address ourselves to this substantive question, it must first be clear what we shall mean by "outside contacts." The term "outsiders" is used repeatedly in Professor Barnett's specification of the variables to be included in the comparative study. What, exactly, are outsiders? In order to answer this question, I have to offer a few generalizations about Orokaiva social structure for which the documentation cannot be included here. A full treatment is given in my doctoral dissertation.

We may view the Orokaiva picture of his social universe as a set of widening concentric circles: family, local clan group, village, the clan within limits of kinship recognition, the consanguineal group within limits of kinship recognition, a group of contiguous friendly villages, the wider set of persons with which an individual entertains institutionalized friendship links, while beyond these limits we may discern even wider circles which become evident in special circumstances. This is an entirely ego-centred model. I saw no evidence of groups of villages which displayed a true corporate unity. Thus village A would have close relations with villages B and C, but village B would not have similarly close bonds with A and C. More likely, villages B and C would treat each other with marked reserve and B would have close relations with A and D; C would have close relations with A and E.

Patrilineages were very shallow in genealogical depth. Though the kinship structure would need to be classified as predominantly patrilineal, I noted a strong consanguineal emphasis. Bonds based on real or fictional siblingship, affinity, matrilineality, institutionalized friendship and--above all--residence and an uninterrupted flow of reciprocal transactions were stronger than all but the closest patrilineal bonds. Though residence was predominantly patri-virilocal, there were many non-agnates in local groups sharing the same clan name; inheritance was not necessarily in the patriline.

571 The social universe of the different families diverged markedly from one another; the small number of extended families composing a minor patrilineage (marked by the possession of a common plant emblem) would share each other's social network and obligations to a large extent, but the same could not even be said for clansmen of different plant emblem groups. In such a culture, the term "outsider" must be situationally defined. For certain situations, only those who share a clan emblem are insiders; for other situations, only clansmen; for others, only residents of the same village, while I can also think of situations where the group of "insiders" embraces a much larger group. We may list the following set of widening concentric circles, as useful for the present study:

(a) Closely allied villages (especially Sivepa, Carombi, Binduta)

(b) The Sasembata district: defined as comprising Sasembata parish or the three Sasembata local government council wards. This is an area close to the road from Kendata to Boru, and never more than an hour's walking distance away from it.

(c) The wider solidarity group to which Williams and several other earlier authors have referred as the "Waseta tribe" (see map)

(d) The indigenous population of Ilimo camp

(e) The "Orokaiva" people

(f) Papuans and New Guineas other than Orokaiva, without special administrative roles

(g) Papuans and New Guineas with offices in the administration, and the Church

(h) Chinese traders

(i) Persons referred to as "taupa" (white man)

(k) The Americans (a special, and by this time somewhat mythical category)

(l) White men believed to be dead ancestors who have returned

For the purpose of this study, I have avoided systematic reference to social structure and emphasized residence rather than kinship. The Inonda pattern resembles, in general, that of Sivepa, except that the sparseness of the population makes the immediate [628] social environment somewhat simpler. Sivepa has significant relations of one sort or another with dozens of villages; Inonda's social universe hardly comprises more than half a dozen, and small ones at that. On the maps Inonda is shown as part of the Sauaha "tribe," but Crocombe and Hogbin treat Sauaha as simply another clan in the vicinity and it is likely that the larger military grouping of which they formed part were Monckton's dreaded Dobuduru.

121 It is our task to consider changes in the patterns of contact with each of these 11 categories of outsiders (as between

[21] January, 1951 and 1967), both in Sivepe and Inonda. In our treatment of the patterns of contact, we need to consider the following variables specified in the Barnett memorandum (1-C #1,2,3,4,5,6,7): role and status of persons involved in transactions, the occasions of contacts and transactions, their purpose, frequency, degree of formality, degree of affectivity, the fiduciary element present in the transactions, their locations; we have to specify how comprehensive the exchanges were (did they involve affinity, friendship?), who were the initiators and what view each of the partners in these exchanges took of the other. In dealing with every one of the categories of outsiders we must, in addition, inquire whether these categories are actually homogeneous; it will often be found that we have to differentiate within the categories. For instance, we have to look whether the Orokaiva distinguish between the different roles, statuses and ethnic origins of persons belonging to the category "taupa." The most convenient way of presenting these data will be by taking each of the 11 categories in turn, dealing with all the variables that seem appropriate to that category.

Section 2: Contacts with Closely Allied Villages

628 The concept of a "closely allied" village is a difficult [621] one: it is not often, in these days of peace, that a village [571] really acts as a corporate unit, so that contacts between villages tend to be, in actual fact, contacts between individuals in these villages who are linked by agnatic, consanguineal, affinal or friendship ties. Out of such ties, inter-village contacts may arise. For instance one village may give a feast for another village and here the unit invited is definitely very often the village; or one village may come to the aid of another after there has been a death and bring food to all members of the bereaved [764] village. The most significant inter-village contacts--those which would occur in time of war when one village went to the aid of another--could no longer be observed, but the ritual immediately after a death resembled that customary when a village was attacked by an enemy. The conch-shell was blown and the closely allied villages would come to the aid of the bereaved one. Hardly anyone would stay behind, if the death was in a really closely allied village. Thus hardly anyone was left in Hohorita, with 400 inhabitants, when an old man died at Sombou which was a closely allied village. On the other hand, if the link between two villages is slightly less close, only those families with kinship or friendship connections will go to the bereaved village. In order to be "closely allied" in the sense just suggested, a village should be geographically close (not much more than a mile away, in the cases of Sivepe, Inonda,

629 village. Williams, in marking out his "Waseta tribe," with Waseta
619 at the centre, excluded the Soroputa people from this "tribe"
(vide Map X) A but "intra-group morality" definitely prevailed
[266] between Soroputa and neighboring Sivepa. There never were
cannibalistic raids between these two villages, which included
each other in their "intra-group morality" circle.

It so happens that the people who were brought together at Ilimo consisted preponderantly of members of what Williams called the "Waseta tribe." The only bonds existing between the members of this tribe were the individual kinship and friendship networks and the solidarity of "intra-group morality" circles. The camp was built as a set of separate villages, each under its own village constable, eating and living separately, though more
[572] closely together than formerly. I obtained from a number of Sivepa
men a list of "friends" and inquired into the occasion when the
[582] friendship started; in no case did it start at Ilimo. On the other hand, the camps led to a number of marriages between people from different villages. This tendency was especially pronounced at Hohorita, which is understandable as so many refugees had lost their families during the eruption. In Sivepa I found one case of a man who married an Agenahambo woman whom he met at Ilimo.

731 If "tribal" solidarity was dubious before the Ilimo camp
628 period, (the atmosphere of an evacuation camp was certainly not
619 a suitable one for developing it. Both Belshaw and Keesing emphasize the anxiety of the inhabitants, their strong desire to return to their home villages, while I have also emphasized their distrust of "others" who might wish to occupy their land; these "others" would inevitably be other members of the Waseta "tribe," although perhaps the Europeans were likewise suspected of predatory aims. (For such suspicion, I do not, however, have evidence.)

A sense of district solidarity did tend to grow up after the eruption, but it can be traced to formal organizations in which Orokaiva occupied roles which brought them into contact with people from other villages. Sometimes these were elite roles, which will be considered below; sometimes they were roles open to anyone, such as that of worker in paid employment, patient in a hospital, pupil in a secondary or advanced primary school, participant in a large-scale public celebration, such as were held in Popondetta and Saiho.

657 The government is actively attempting to create among the
571 Orokaiva larger solidary units than existed in the past. We may thus explain the various attempts that are made to bring Orokaiva people together in the local government council, at numerous sports meetings and celebrations such as at Christmas and New Year, and by any other expedient means. Without the popular acceptance of the local government council the establishing of a land boundary between Sivepa and Soroputa or Agenahambo, to stay with my previous example, would have been hard to imagine. Yet it

A [See Cat. 116, p. End Map 9--Analyst]

was accomplished without any European power bearer making his appearance and any sense of compulsion being created--the people clearly considered the boundaries advocated by the government to be in the popular interest. Yet the bonds of solidarity this being formed do not strengthen the unity of the so-called Waseta tribe but the unity of the Higaturu council area as a whole.

In this section I have said little about Inonda, because I did not have time to clarify what "tribe" Inonda really belongs. Williams' tribal map shows Inonda as Sauaha; Crocombe and Hogbin describe Sauaha, quite correctly, as a clan resident near the settlement of Dobuduru (where the people speak a different dialect, presumably that which Williams called Dirou). Clearly, the task of establishing "tribal" units in this district would need to be done again, if it is worth doing at all, which I doubt, for reasons already given.

Section 5: Contacts With Other Orokaiva

Generally, contacts outside the "Waseta tribe" are sparse. During the year, only one visit was made to Sivepa, in a kinship context, by persons from another district. This was a group from Kokoda, where a Sivepe man married 40 or more years ago, and the visit was from that man's children. Several Sivepe persons quoted as an ancestor a woman from Ajoro, a village close to Inonda. It turned out that all these linkages were due to one single event, namely the capture by the Isivita people of three Ajoro women during a raid. Two of these found their way to Garombi where they married; the third woman's son came to live in Sivepe. Descendants of the Sivepe man continue to exercise each year their hunting rights at Ajoro. I could not find other references to ancestors beyond the "Waseta tribe" apart from these. Some people mentioned a friend, but rarely more than one, who came from another "tribal" district. Often these friends were found during employment, or at the mission school, or they were persons with special roles in mission or government, who had come to the Sasembata district in the course of their jobs. When women had such friends, it was more often due to a kinship link. An interesting example of the extending of such links under modern conditions occurred when a man from Sasembata village, employed in Kokoda, invited a number of fellow workers to Sasembata for a football game. These men were likewise in Kokoda for employment and came from the Aiga district.

When the members of the "Waseta tribe" were accommodated at Ilimo, they were not only the guests of the government which supplied food and other comforts, but also of the people of Ilimo village who had agreed to the camp being established. From the little I could find out about relationships between hosts and

184 Jegase, thus making Sivepe basically into a two-clan village, into
621 which some recent Garombi immigrants remain to be integrated. Inonda,
614 in 1951, consisted of 13 houses of which nine were inhabited by Andiriha, three by Jego-undi and one bachelor's house. In 1966, there were only seven houses, only one of which was occupied by Jego-undi. Hence, Inonda has almost ceased to be a two-clan village today.

571 I have written at length about modern Orokaiva leadership elsewhere (Schwimmer, 1967) and shall do little more here than summarise the conclusions already published. The scope and range of Orokaiva leadership has always been small, except for the heads of extended families (okose) who had a very wide scope of authority. Each village had a set of experts who had unquestioned authority in their sphere of expertise. Examples are the medicine man, the hunting expert,
[554] dancing expert and some others. One of these experts, the feasting
[622] expert, is in fact the man of highest status in the clan or village and may be called its leader. A clan leader may take responsibility
[614] for such corporate actions as a modern clan performs, e.g., raise bride price for one of its members. Except in these circumscribed situations, he is esteemed and respected rather than obeyed. The village leader, in a multi-clan village, is usually the leader of the largest clan. In dealings with other villages, he is the man to whom most respect must be paid; it is here, and when acting as a feasting leader, that he most closely approaches the role of power-bearer. Even so, the Orokaiva word for "feasting leader" is pondo kiari embo, i.e., feasting expert, and in explanation of his role informants always stress that it is based on expertise rather than on a more diffuse concept of status. I also found, after inquiring in Inonda, Hohorita and seven villages in the Sasembata district, that in fact the fathers of all these feasting leaders had occupied the same positions. Nonetheless, informants always denied that the office was inherited; rather, the fact of succession was explained by the transmission of the necessary knowledge from father to son.

621 Australian domination added at once the role of village constable
622 to this somewhat acephalous pattern. One gathers from Monckton that
625 the village constable was chosen on the assumption that he had been the traditional leader. How often that assumption was justified I do not know. In Inonda, he certainly was the Andiriha clan leader.
614 In Sivepe, the situation was more complex. Until about 1939, Sivepe had no village constable of its own, but an Awala man was village constable for a wide area centred on Awala and including Sivepe. The first and only Sivepe village constable was a man now baptised under the name of Samuel but then called Jovareka. Jovareka appeared as witness to prove the innocence of two Sivepe men (from the Seho clan) who had been accused of murdering a small boy from Awala. He showed successfully that the village constable had trumped up a charge against the two Sivepe men and the government appointed Jovareka village constable in his place. Later, Jovareka's area was reduced to a more

625 731 excursions. This was, however, an experience of short duration and, once back in Sivepe, the village constable reverted to his former role, as described above. In 1956, all village constables handed back to the government their handcuffs, the symbol of their authority, and the Local Government Councils took over.

[685] [571] With regard to interpersonal relations, the evacuation set up a mutual distrust due to the removal of certain social controls. Theft is comparatively uncommon in Orokaiva villages, but this is because property is extremely well-guarded and everyone in the village is constantly under observation by other villagers. The idea of villages being left unguarded was repugnant to Orokaiva, and fear of prowling had to be countered by strict control on the part of village constables over anyone entering the restricted area. I could find no evidence of a change in interpersonal relations beyond the period of evacuation.

476 571 The Orokaiva are not often observed to work in groups; from the relatively acephalous structure it may already be inferred that they do not have regular work leaders controlling groups. Most gardening is done by each extended family separately; house building is done by the prospective occupants with the help of some individuals who feel an obligation, mostly a brother or brother-in-law. Even at feasts, there is a minimum of truly communal labour: the food is supplied by individuals who deliver it to the display platform and it is only the dancing, the ceremonial and a few minor construction tasks that may be communal. There are in Sivepe two yam gardens where work is communal; these are in sharp contrast to all other garden work. Yet people readily gather for common efforts which have a festive and ceremonial nature or enterprises which arouse an episodic enthusiasm. Examples are the communal fishing and hunting expeditions, projects such as the mission hospital or the marking of the ward boundary.

Even during these communal episodes, the tendency is for each small group to perform a certain task separately, though contemporaneously. A hunting party splits up into family groups who do not meet again until the hunt is over. In fishing each group has its own spot. Similarly in the building of new Sivepe, there was little that was overtly communal, as each small group was working on a house for themselves or a close kinsman. Nonetheless, one would be wrong to [342] [177] describe this pattern as Individualistic. After all, every house was in the same style and of the same size--and this was not wholly a "traditional" style; it was a style introducing new materials and an increase in size of about 50%. When such a change is made by everybody who builds a new house, this indicates that the group is strongly bound by collective decisions.

177 654 571 Unwittingly, the Australian government has tended to make the Orokaiva more oriented towards group work than he was before. Road work, the compulsory planting of rubber trees, compulsory resettlement in larger villages--all these added to the volume of group work while the volume of individual work remained constant within the villages.

654 The rubber plantings followed a quota established for each village;
177 in practise, a village man would make one of his garden plots available
571 to the community at large and all the village trees would be planted
476 there. This would be a communal work project. In accordance with Orokaiva tradition, however, the product of these rubber trees would be individually appropriated, each man being allowed to collect a limited quantity of rubber for himself and market it. The tasks of building the mission station and maintaining it further added to the amount of group work required. Men who took jobs on plantations once more found themselves in a group work situation which formed a contrast with the earlier tradition of individual effort.

474 It is paradoxical that the Australians, after first encouraging
177 this group orientation, soon found themselves fighting against it, in
241 the belief that they were face to face with that dangerous phenomenon "communism." The immediate post-war period, up to the time of the eruption, was the time when an ideologically based cooperative movement took root in the Northern District. This movement, which was centred on Gona, has been well described in general terms by Dakeyne (1966).
[777] It was the direct result of the work of two Anglican clergymen, Revs. Benson and Clint, who preached the virtues of cooperatives, and encouraged the cultivation of a great many village plots of rice and peanuts between the years 1947-1951. Dakeyne reports: "Rev. Flint was insistent that Christian ritual be associated with co-operative action. Educational and committee meetings always closed with a special prayer, there were church services at which tools were blessed and newly planted seed was blessed in the gardens. This aspect of the cooperative movement was regarded with some apprehension by Administration officers who felt it could be misunderstood by the Papuans and possibly lead to the development of a cargo cult. There was some evidence to suggest that a cult did in fact begin." (1966: 60)

The evidence, which Dakeyne does not cite, is interesting enough to be worth a brief mention. Kleekham, the agricultural officer for the coastal area at that time, reports in a memorandum (Kleekham, n.d.) that leaders of the movement were collecting taxes secretly and that "some mystical element was involved" in rice marketing. Kleekham had a huller and was willing to hull rice for growers" consumption or buy it for cash, but the people withheld their produce. He thought that this aloofness was due to the growers' belief "that the formation of and participation in cooperatives would--magically or mystically--in short time raise the native to the status of the European in all respects."

In some form, this movement reached both Sivepe and Inonda. At Sivepe, one man made a plot available where people could "cooperatively" grow rice. A deacon stationed at Sasembata, but a member of the Yega tribe where the movement had its origin, blessed the seeds and (according to my informant, allocated a section of the field to different individuals. The rice was hulled by the Administration's agriculture officer at Waseta and each man took his own rice back home, giving a

474 plus other amounts of unknown size--enough for the projected establish-
443 ment of a trade store. Rimoldi's report suggests that cooperation between the villages for this project was difficult to attain; the mission teacher who was to coordinate the project withdrew. (1963: 107-108) After Rimoldi left, one of the Sivepe clans (Jegase) evidently went ahead with some scheme to open a trade store at Sivepe and lost all its money. There was some dishonesty on the part of someone, but I did not try to explore this. When I arrived, the plan to open a trade store was still alive, but people did not like the idea of its being operated by a clan; one of the families of the Jegase clan was playing with the idea of raising some money and starting one. It seems likely that the savings accumulated by the Timuna clan, to which Rimoldi refers, were lost along with the Jegase savings.

454 In 1966, two group savings accounts were in operation. People
621 had no project in mind for which these savings were intended, but it was felt to be salutary to have savings because there would be no chance otherwise, as I was told, to reach equal status with Europeans. One of these savings accounts was for the whole village, and this is probably the one opened in 1961, referred to by Rimoldi. In 1966, when these bonds matured, the Seho clan leader brought all the money home in two-dollar bills and handed these to each contributor at a meeting. Most of the contributors handed their money back for later investment. The second savings account was operated by one clan, for the purpose of its own bride price and similar payments; as it was clan money, the facts about it were secret. The village fund contained $158.

474 The only cooperative effort known to me at Inonda was a regular
439 arrangement by which vegetables grown at Inonda were carted to the Bubi Hospital and sold there, in 1967. Towards the end of 1966, some vegetables were sold in the same way to the government in Popondetta. In this case, the proceeds were shared between individual growers. The arrangement was the result of contact between the man who had become a government driver and the appropriate authorities. The carrier was an affine.

571 Finally, a notable aspect of social organisation in the post-
[554] eruption period is the emergence of leaders whose authority rests on
[177] two sources: status in traditional terms and status conferred by Australian-sponsored organisations. The village constables could sometimes be so classified, at least superficially. Only on rare instances, however, were they champions of Western values who sought to influence the minds of the people towards acceptance of these values. They did not ask their people to accept Australian organisations as a source of authority (if Weber's definition of this term be accepted)
654 but only to recognise them as an effective source of compulsion. The
571 people of Sivepe, as well as Hohorita verevery much aware that the
623 position of the councillors and committees, successors of the village constables, was very different. The councillor's job was to preach the doctrine of the "new way;" people would tell me how bored they

were to hear this message all the time; yet they came to listen and speakers managed to introduce enough news and good oratory to hold general attention. Furthermore, both in discussion after the speeches and later in private, they agreed with a good deal of it. There was no compulsion about this; if they were bored or disagreed, they were apt to slip away, either with an excuse or without one. If they became really tired of a councillor, they need not re-elect him after his two-year term was over. The councillors were the first, I was told, to change the people's thinking. The "committee" were not given to such oratory; people would never have tolerated it; their job was a humbler, purely executive one. But their actions were always in pursuance of the general principles enunciated by councillors; they were made "legitimate" by what the councillors said. "Committee" was definitely not the mouthpiece of Australian authority, but of the council. This was an ambiguous position, as I already pointed out, because the courts on which the councillor depended as ultimate sanction, was Australian-controlled. Nonetheless, at the level of face-to-face relationships, which mattered most, the "committee" had to rely on his own authority.

Some were not very successful; in Sivepe, the "committee" was at the same time clan-leader and feast-leader; it was therefore very hard indeed to ignore him. In villages where the feast-leader stood aloof from the Council structure, the malcontents could gather round him and defy Council authority until the patrol officer intervened. This is what happened in Carombi, a neighbour-village to Sivepe. Here traditional and modern authority were vested in different persons, whereas in Sivepe both were vested in the same person.

The pattern of religious leadership was much more subtle. First, at Sivepe and Inonda, as in many other places, cooperation with the mission began long before anyone was baptised or even a catechist. At Sasembata, the first phase started after the war. The Orokaiva were glad to have the mission because it provided education for their children (this was the advantage always cited) and no doubt also because of some benefits in the form of European goods. In return for these benefits, the local people helped with land and with labour for buildings, carrying, etc. The man on whose property the rice was grown before the eruption was not, and never became a Christian but died a Pagan in 1963. It was consistent with Orokaiva religious concepts to ask a deacon to bless the seeds of a European crop--the Orokaiva do not know the magic appropriate to this crop, whereas the deacon could be presumed to know.

None of the people now living at Sivepe were baptised before the eruption. After the post-eruption Sasembata station was established a large number of people were soon accepted as catechists and on 6 March, 1963, 1165 people from all parts of the Sasembata district were baptised, including some from Sivepe; there was a second mass baptism in September, 1955, and by this time at least one lineage (or plant emblem group) in Sivepe was wholly Christian. The most senior man in

657 retained as much land as they had before, after the boundary was cut.
423 They had received some Sivepe land and they had lost an approximately equal amount of their own.

Thus, the lower Sasembata ward is now declared an adjudication area of which the owners are about 600 people listed in the census records. Between them, these 600 people are now the undisputed owners of perhaps 2,400 acres of gardening land. The government would now like to see this area subdivided into some 120 economic holdings registered in the name of a single owner, but this is recognised as being extremely difficult. In one respect, however, this latest government approach is vastly superior to the previous ones. In treating residence as the basis of Orokaiva land rights, the new policy comes much closer to Orokaiva conceptions than earlier schemes which treated the patrilineal clan as the basic unit. The choice of the ward (rather than the village) as the adjudication area was fortunate in that it was much less disruptive of residual rights held by agnatic and at times affinal kin residing in nearby villages. On the other hand, the assumption that the ward territory can be profitably subdivided into 20-acre family holdings may not conform with Orokaiva expectations and conceptions. The administration is in danger, in this respect, of being misled by its own ideological bias. The enthusiasm people [591] felt about the establishment of ward boundaries was based on the hope that thus the people of the constituent villages could form a big "company," as cooperating group which would function as a cooperative. I have already mentioned the paradox that the Orokaiva is an individualist but at the same time has a deep belief in the power that can be gained from corporate action. Ward producers' cooperatives, if they can be organised, may provide an excellent incentive to productivity while at the same time enabling some mechanisation to be introduced, both in transport and cultivation. The model I have in mind here is that of the incorporations established among the New Zealand Maori in the Native Land Act 1909, and developed since until their annual income today is in the range of several million dollars, earned largely by sizeable units often with an ownership running into several hundreds. (See Hunn, 1961; Schwimmer, 1968: 26-28.)

The problem of adapting Orokaiva land tenure to conditions of [731] a cash economy, though not yet solved, has some promise of being successfully tackled. If all Orokaiva land were held under secure tenure, many new areas would undoubtedly be planted in coffee and other crops. The resettlement programme following the eruption of Mount Lamington has not, as I have shown, contributed anything to the establishment of persons on secure land holdings but the present policy of consolidation, perhaps followed by partitioning into economic family lots, is more likely to achieve this objective.

159 external representation of Sivepe was at stake, the two men worked together admirably as a team. Lawrence solved the tricky problems of partitioning blocks shared between villages with a speed which would make any surveyor envious, and got agreement from the other parties because the solutions he proposed seemed fair. Robert carried out his own function of seeing that the working parties came together, that the clearing work was done for the survey posts, and so on. However, when I took them both to Popondetta in my car, they had very little to say to each other. When I told Lawrence who his companion was to be, he gave me a look of mock despair. (He had a different look of mock despair for my use of the Orokaiva language.)

[829] Robert was more deeply involved with mission values than any [126] of the others. He was the only one to have recognised that our [124] civilisation actually does have some moral values. I recorded stories from a great many informants on tape--the subjects being usually selected by the informant for these longer texts. Robert was the only one to have chosen themes overtly showing a mission influence: one story was about a Father Holland who was betrayed to the Japanese by Orokaiva during the war; the other story was his own version of Adam and Eve and the Fall, to which he gave a splendid Orokaiva twist: God, dismissing the couple from the Garden of Eden, said: "For a long time you will have sorrowful days and be sad, but also you will have happy days and be happy. Thus he spoke and all of us today live in this manner."

571 To conclude these impressionistic sketches, I shall suggest a 157 contrast between the leadership of Sivepe and Inonda. When we consider the two men just described, or Samuel, the village constable, Robert's father and the councillor, an immigrant from Binduta, we notice that none of them stood out from the rest of the village by superior wealth. Certainly, Robert's father once gave a big feast in Sivepe; he had some savings and gave another small feast while I was in the village, but he stood out mainly in virtue of his role and his personality. The councillor was a consummate actor who exuded a great air of authority while he was in the council. But in Inonda, the village constable, Oriri, was at the same time an entrepreneur, the first cash cropper. He was also the occupier of a strikingly larger area of land than anyone else had. His son, Stephen, the driver, likewise was very much an entrepreneur, both in his cash-cropping ventures and in his attempt at a trade store, at trading in coffee, in vegetables and lately, his application for a loan to start a cattle farm. He is not intending to do the farming himself, but wants to have a younger brother-in-law trained, and he is to work under Stephen's supervision.

Both Stephen and Oriri still continue their interest in traditional observances. The father, who lives on a returned servicemen's section where he grows cocoa, came back to his home village to act as feast leader in 1967. This was very much a traditional affair, with a proper feast house, a ceremony to call down the spirits, chants and dances for the spirits for several weeks, something Sivepe would

not care to do with the mission quite so close. On this occasion the village looked more harmonious than I saw it at other times; the pagan half was fully able to join in.

The main difference in leadership--the premise of equality in Sivepe, the "big man" complex (see Sahlins, 1963, etc.) in Inonda--is probably attributable to an organisational difference between the mountain and coastal villages. In all my contacts with coastal people I have noticed the same posture of the "big man" among the persons of high rank. In the Sasembata district, however, it is not so easily tolerated if a man tries to stand above his fellows. There was a talented entrepreneur in Hamburata village, but this man was more interested in heading a cooperative than in purely private or family aggrandisement. There are, however, cooperatives on the coast also, and the case of Inonda may not be a typical one.

Section 4: Marginal Individuals

In this section the attempt at comparing the two villages broke down. This was because Inonda had as far as I know only one outstandingly marginal individual and shortly after I arrived they put him in jail. He had broken into a store with a hammer belonging to another villager; the other villager was apprehended by the police and successfully proved he had been framed.

In Sivepe, there were several marginal individuals some of whom became key personalities, I think, mainly because of our presence. Both our interpreters fell into that category. One of them was an unmarried mother and therefore already marginal. She was also extremely intelligent, knew English rather well, was the secretary of the woman's club. Her position was weakened because her father and mother were both dead; the father of her child came from her father's village; she therefore had been sent to her mother's village. Here she reached prominence in the affairs of the women's club and as our interpreter (she always translated holding or feeding the baby, but most reliably) but her position in her mother's brother's house was a delicate one and she had to leave her mother's father's house where she lived earlier. Although she was attractive, and only 22 years of age, her chances of marriage were though extremely dim. She exploited to the full the chances of power provided by her association with us, especially in the earlier period when I understood no Orokaiva at all.

The other interpreter, also about 22, was Robert's younger brother. While Patricia, the women's club secretary, was extremely gregarious and adept at handling people, Leon, with a Standard 6 education, and the leading male expert in the English language and other school knowledge, was unusually shy. He was hardly ever seen talking spontaneously to any of the married men. He heartily disliked the interview situation and other duties that would draw him into the public. This tendency

124 really stood. In this, there may have been a certain hollowness;
177 I never saw among all the Orokaiva a young man who was as scared of his affines as this one. One reason why I employed the young woman as second interpreter was that nothing would induce him to open his mouth when I wanted to talk to his classificatory father-in-laws. In all significant respects, then, he offered little challenge to accepted tradition.

Children were trained by their parents in the prevalent system
867 of custom and belief, as modified by recent changes; they maintained
869 their traditional regard for their elders, not regarding their school
177 knowledge as giving them any claims to superiority. Their elders did, as far as I know, make no use of the knowledge their children gained at school; my two interpreters were the technicians when letters had to be written or other newfangled problems solved. Everyone in the
621 village, including ourselves, were expected to fulfill reciprocal
571 obligations in the community; the acculturated young were certainly
602 expected to help their kinsfolk, especially if their knowledge had yielded cash. Even those absent on jobs in town were always asked (and occasionally expected) to help. There was only one partial escape from community obligations and that was to live outside the village. Migrants knew that whatever possessions they had amassed away from home would soon have to be shared out if they returned to Sivepe. While they were away, they could more often refuse demands with impunity. But they knew that unsatisfied claims tended to be stacked up against their return. Some claims were purely try-ons. I have myself been the communicator of such claims from a Kongohambo man to his kinsmen in Port Moresby; I could see that the response to some of them was merely hearty laughter. But others, communicated at the same time, were taken seriously; some gift had to be made.

The penalty threatening an absentee who neglected his kin had
[626] to be paid when that absentee returned; especially when that absentee
[423] wanted to resume possession of his land holdings. Little would it benefit him that certain lands had been left to him by his father, for during his absence, other men had been "looking after" them. If he had neglected these men, his rights would be hard to reassert; the community would give him little sympathy. If he had been generous during his absence, he could be strong in his claims; his relations would then show him benevolence. Rights could be kept warm only by constant exchanges; a moratorium of more than one year begins to be risky. While a man is in town, the exchanges seem unequal; money or clothes go to the village; some taro are sent to town (when I went to Port Moresby I was given a sack of these to carry, to be distributed by a knowing relative in town).

For those who remain in the village, the sanctioning mechanisms
626 are mostly informal. Failure in one's obligations means loss of status, leads to gossip, derogatory remarks to one's face, perhaps even a harangue at night by a man at the other end in the village.

241 of "dry" gardening, with fire and the digging stick as the essential tools, and either long term rotation of previously occupied areas or breaking in of new forest land. "The immediate family . . . is a self sufficient unit" and "the Orokaiva words for 'work' and 'garden' are one and the same." Con-
621 sistent with this mobile economic base, settlements are rarely more than hamlet size, with "hardly more than a dozen houses" on the average. Materials for housing are readily available, so that residence can be easily shifted.

The hamlet is based normally on patrilocal-patrilineal principles of organization, with a known strong tendency for new groups to form by "hiving off." Clan affiliations are
[614] reckoned from quite recent ancestors, so that at times a given clan may all be in one settlement, though more usually scattered through several closely related settlements. The
592 generally monogamous family units are under the "immediate
621 authority of the father," while the affairs of the local living
622 units are under loose supervision by the hamlet and clan elders, centered on a "men's house" and working together, usually with one strong senior man as "leader." Personal
422 property consists of mobile goods such as tools and utensils, clothing, and body ornaments.

181 In spite of ethnic similarities over a wide region, Williams speaks of the Orokaiva as being a "more than usually quarrelsome and disunited people"—a strong statement to make in the New Guinea setting. Their pre-pacification history was marked by "feuds, dispersals . . . a veritable whirlpool of strife, migration, and counter-migration." Beaver, too, refers to their "turbulent and restless life . . . migration was, in
[1154] the main, a matter of attacking, fleeing, and pursuing." Supernatural weapons in the form of sorcery were especially feared. Even for Papuans, the Orokaiva proved to be unusually
[562] hostile and resistant to whites. Women were often seen ac-
[1126] companying the war parties, carrying food and weapons, and sometimes joining in fights. Williams goes on to say that while the "elementary small sympathy-groups" (the local
[628] kin and settlement units, and to a lesser extent the dispersed clan units) were tightly knit, their external relations were
[1728] precarious. "There were peacemakings or truces, but the truce was always a fragile one, and no (settlement) lived in permanent security." "Hiving off" occurred sometimes
361 as the result of a "quarrel and the fear of retaliatory magic,",
241 but more often it was "simply the lax method of horticulture which necessitates the clearing of many areas in succession
[1578] and sometimes a temporary settlement on a distant site." Another factor could have been food scarcities which tend
361 to occur in exceptionally dry southeast winter seasons. During
261 this period, north and west Lamington area is in a rainshadow zone, and people may have to scatter out to live on wild
731 roots and fruits. The implication of this is that even the
165 excision of the 4,000 persons from the Orokaiva group who were killed involved no extensive shattering of valued ties.

361 Williams and others judge that with the modern pacifica-
178 tion, the Orokaiva have tended to disperse in even smaller living units than before. This appears to apply particularly
[1990] to the relatively densely populated Lamington slopes, though a few instances of larger aggregations approaching a village
361 type also occurred, particularly as a result of Mission influ-
571 ence. Over against this greater dispersal, the people have;

mingled more freely as a result of travel on the government roads and trails (which they have to keep in order), trading, Mission and official gatherings, and other new opportunities for interpersonal relations. One special feature of Orokaiva life in modern times is the annual burning-off of grasslands by hunting parties in order to get wild game. This has probably involved the assembly of larger groups and is one of the few activities which could induce intersettlement co-operation. The writer sensed the parallel of the crude local fires set for garden clearing and the general burning-off of grasslands to the major burning and blackening in the wake of the volcano—doubtless a mighty job of clearing to the Orokaiva eye.

Within the limits that brief characterizations of personality norms can be valid, observers seem to agree that the Orokaiva as individuals have traits congruent with the social structure that favor individuality and mobility. Even the casual visitor gets a sense of independence, alertness, self-reliance, "strong talking," dignity, restraint, imperturbability at meeting the unexpected event, and high-tension interpersonal behavior in general. This is in particularly striking contrast to such an elaborately structured society as that of Samoa, where the writer had been working shortly before. In informal groups seen around the camps and waiting at airfields for transport, women and children, far from being in the background, kept up a busy verbal exchange with the men. The Administration has considered the Orokaiva territory as perhaps the best recruiting ground for its Royal Papuan Constabulary on the basis of these personality characteristics, including ability to meet crisis conditions such as patrols may encounter.

The Orokaiva religious history is also particularly interesting here. Their traditional faith, Williams says, though in many respects vague and locally variable, concerned itself "primarily with the spirits of the dead" and their influence on the welfare of the living. Death was appraised with particular realism, although it was considered ultimately as the result of supernatural causes. Magic had a consistent place. Orokaiva country, however, has been swept in modern times by a series of new cults indicative of religious adaptability in the face of fresh experience. First to come into prominence was the *Baigona*, or "snake cult" of 1911-12, succeeded from 1914 on by the so-called "Taro cult" which in turn had undergone a series of local reformulations by the time Williams reported on it in 1924.[7] Central features of the Taro cult were association of successful taro cultivation with the ancestral spirits, approached by way of a "shaking-fit" technique of revelation, together with somewhat new types of public ritual and symbols, including fragmentary elements from Christianity. Later Belshaw and others reported that "Christian Co-operative Evangelist" societies, which were developed by the Anglican Mission among some Orokaiva converts for the cooperative growing of rice and other crops, tended to assume a somewhat parallel and absorbing mystical agriculture context. Rumors spread of "an order from the King (of England) that co-operatives

7. *Orokaiva Magic*, Part I; see also Chinnery, E. W. P. and Haddon, A. C., "Five New Religious Cults in British New Guinea," *Hibbert Journal*, 15, 3 pp. 448-463 (1917). Materials are also found in the official reports of the time.

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that instead of timeless constructs of primitive philosophers we are occupied with a series of historical events both before and after the eruption, all of which became signs much in the same way as the eruption; the explanation will take the form of the tracing of associations between these signs. There are, however, some stable principles governing these connections. We turn to these first.

I have argued elsewhere that the social structure of the Orokaiva is characterized by a weak patrilineality with small corporate groups but that exchange transactions between these groups are, in many respects, highly structured (Schwimmer 1970a, n.d.). These exchanges follow rules which are justified by an elaborate system of thought arising out of the principle that gift making is the source of social potency and exchange is the measure of that potency. Such a system, by its very nature, makes no assumptions about the permanency of social associations, as it is only the success of exchange transactions that allows associations (outside the small corporate groups) to endure. Decisions about the upkeep of particular associations are of necessity determined by criteria of allocation. According to Orokaiva ideas, associations go through alternating periods of positive reciprocity (friendship) and negative reciprocity (war). Whereas in Western thought permanence is considered normal and quarrels a deviation from the norm, the Orokaiva do not envisage either friendship or enmity as permanent states but rather as alternating temporary states.

The implication of this philosophy for social relations (and this includes Orokaiva-white relations) is that they never are what a Westerner would call "friendly" or "hostile." It would be more correct to say that at any given time they may be going through a positive (friendly) or negative (hostile) cycle. Movements from positive to negative cycles tend to be gradual, since in the Orokaiva view social relations tend to deteriorate constantly, little by little, until they become hostile. On the other hand, movements from negative to positive cycles tend to be highly dramatic and ritualized—usually through reconciliation feasts and gifts. In relations with Europeans, reconciliations are harder to effect since there is no commensality between the ethnic groups.

If it is natural for social relations to deteriorate constantly and gradually, it is still possible to decide that one will allow an association to deteriorate before one takes active steps to restore it. Such a choice is determined by many factors: intrinsic attraction

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felt toward the exchange partner, fear of the trouble he might cause, instrumental benefits he has to offer, the importance of the partner in the total exchange network, and so on.

Anger, in this Orokaiva philosophy, is a normal attitude toward a partner with whom one stands, for the time being, in a relation of negative reciprocity. An exchange of injuries takes place until peace is made by the offer of an appropriate gift and feast. The anger of Sumbiripa does not completely fall into this pattern because here the exchange relationship is somewhat limited in scope. Sumbiripa's gift to man is the safe confinement of the dead, whereas man's gift is merely the avoidance of any disturbance of Sumbiripa's mountain. Man mediates the relationship by sending his dead to Sumbiripa; Sumbiripa mediates it by emitting his usually innocuous rumbling. Before 1951, Sumbiripa was not known by Orokaiva to have ever erupted. Hunting on the mountain and similar infractions were believed to have broken the exchange relationship and thus aroused Sumbiripa to a just reprisal.

Sumbiripa's anger was righteous not only because he was a god. In the framework of Orokaiva thought, serious anger is normally regarded as righteous, at least among persons standing in a regular exchange relationship. If anger expresses itself in verbal abuse or physical violence it is not serious, but it becomes so if misfortunes occur because of sorcery imputed to the person who is wronged. The successful magical expression of anger proves that anger to be well founded. A man may of course decide to use countermagic, and if that works the anger is no longer serious. If countermagic does not work, a man must be ready to acknowledge his fault and make reparations.

In such a dispute it is of course relevant which side has broken a rule, but the rules are most often debatable. In the end nothing is considered worse than to have made another person seriously angry. Prudence demands that seriously angry persons should be mollified, unless their kinship and physical distance is such that they can be defined as enemies. But even between enemies, a time comes when anger is shown by magical and other misfortunes to become inexpedient.

Self-accusation and self-inflicted injury are a regular part of this system. In order to make peace a person must define himself as the transgressor (Schwimmer 1970a, n.d.), as the Papuans did in the 'anger of God' explanation. Self-injury is a regular strategic

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601 our concern is with the total *philia* universe. Meaningful contacts outside the
[571] village tend to be almost wholly with persons of the same generation. I shall therefore discuss the intra-generational terms of reference and address, both in the kin and friendship idioms, and both in the Sangara and Sasembata dialects.

The kinship idiom[7] (discussed in detail in Schwimmer, 1970a) contains four consanguinal and three affinal terms; an oversimplified analysis gives the following meanings (for an explanation of the symbols, see footnote 7):

apa SS Sen G-O //C	*simbo* G-O X C	*dambo* Me SS G-O A
eambo SS Jun G-O // C	*ivu* husband	*hovatu* OS G-O A
du OS G-O //C	*ae* wife	*bi* Fe SS G-O A

602 Affinal relations, according to explicit Orokaiva norms, are cold, formal, and
601 distant though polite, and restrained by strict taboos. Affinal terminology always carries the connotation of obligation and avoidance, and it is never suitable for easy informal discourse. Indeed, when a person desires to keep up easy, informal relations with an affine (and this occasionally happens), his only resource is to maintain whatever term of address he used before the marriage.

All the consanguine terms, however, are regularly used in addressing unrelated persons with whom hereditary friendship links exist, at least in the [171] Sasembata district. *Apa* and *eambo* are also used between men in the same context as the Maori use the term *hoa*; that is, informally and without any implication of kinship or permanent relationship. The wife of a fictional *apa* or *eambo* is called *du* (sibling of opposite sex), but never by an affinal term. The fictional *simbo* differs from the fictional sibling with regard to reciprocal rights and obligations, as will be shown below.

572 The following Orokaiva terms are used exclusively in a friendship context: *namei* (Sangara) or *apa/eambo* (Sasembata), designating a male friend of a male speaker in the same generation; *otavo* (Sangara and Sasembata) meaning a partner in trading or dancing, or a journey, or a war expedition – a

7 The following classificatory principles underlie the Orokaiva kinship system:
Consanguine (C): *Ego* traces relationship to *alter* through a chain of linkages based on filiation, or a shared clan name, or common birth in a distant village.
Affine (A): Spouses of consanguines of own and junior generation; co-eval and senior consanguines of those spouses.
Generational Removal: G-O: Same generation as *ego*. G1: One generation removed. G2: Two or more generations removed.
Sex of alter: Me: Male. Fe: Female.
Relative sex of ego and alter: SS: Same Sex. OS: Opposite Sex.
Relative sex in consanguineal linkages: //: Relationship is either wholly agnatic or wholly uterine. X: Relationship is neither wholly agnatic nor wholly uterine. It passes through at least one opposite sex linkage.
Relative age of alter: Sen: Older. Jun: Younger.

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572 less diffuse term than *apa/eambo*; *jao* (Sangara and Sasembata) designating a *namei* type of relationship between women, used commonly between unrelated married women living in the same village.

Friends as a Distinctive Set

601 572 The Orokaiva employ certain collective terms to designate the *philia* universe or distinctive parts of it. Thus, the term *mamahane* (father's people) designates the agnatic group, *epehane* (mother's brother's people) the maternal relatives, *aerihane* (wife's people) the affines, and *japehane* (literally, grandmother's people) the father's mother's group. There is, in addition, a term *nameikamei* which comprises the total *philia* universe including an undefined residue of non-kin as well as all the groups listed above. Although Sasembata do not use the term *namei* (friend), *nameikamei* is heard regularly. In neither locality was a collective term found which exclusively comprised the non-kin in the *philia* universe.

The term *nameikamei* certainly covered, apart from the kinsmen, the (Sangara) *namei* category and the *jao*, terms which are both regularly inherited bilaterally. I cannot say for certain whether the *otavo* and (fictive) *simbo* categories would be included in the *nameikamei* group. These terms may be employed in fairly casual relationships, but in time, persons calling one another *otavo* may decide to use a sibling term, thus making the relationship hereditary.

Statistically, non-kin make up only a small part of the *philia* universe. A man might be able to list several dozen *nameikamei* in villages more than three miles from his home, and non-kin would make up only 20 to 25 percent of such a list. (It should be noted that my statistics are somewhat cursory, as I could never be sure that any informant's list was complete.) Visits from non-kin tend to be made at greater intervals than visits from kin and they last a shorter time. One could safely say that non-kin are, on the whole, on the periphery of the *philia* network, as is the case among the Tangu.

An interesting difference between the two systems is that the hereditary relationship which is between fictive brothers-in-law among the Tangu, is between brothers (*apa/eambo*) among the (Sasembata) Orokaiva. It would be considered not only chilly but frightening for an Orokaiva to call his guest friend *dambo* – affine avoidance being stronger than among the Tangu.

Orokaiva Cooperative Alliances and Reciprocating Partnerships

571 [621] [614] Cooperative alliances tend to vary in size according to the purpose of the alliance. In pre-contact times, the village was a cooperative alliance in warfare and in large feasts, comprising between six to twelve households. For bridewealth and death payments, the alliance comprises the plant emblem group (Williams, 1925; 1930; Schwimmer, 1970a), the nucleus of which approximates a four-generation lineage, although it also has other members.

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571 But for most everyday purposes, the cooperative alliance is even smaller and does not extend beyond the three-generation family.

571 604 881 Relations with uterines, affines, and more distant agnates (that is, those beyond the lineage, and those who are resident in other villages) follow the pattern of competitive exchange. An example of what this implies would be the role of mother's brother as officiator at initiations. Elsewhere, (Schwimmer, 1970b) I show that ideologically, he is the proper person for the office, but that the father's brother and even the father would do as well. The mother's brother is not obliged to act; he is paid if he acts; furthermore he will act only if prior to an initiation, the neophyte involved has obliged his uncle by rendering him small services and being pleasant to him. Certainly the mo/bro si/so relationship is a warm affectionate one, but it is explicitly free from unconditional obligation. It is, in fact, the first formal relationship into which a person enters, where prestations on both sides are by free choice.

602 572 171 How can we explain that, at least in Sasembata, the Orokaiva classify guest friends with the sibling group (by applying the terms *apa/eambo* to them), whereas the Tangu use an affinal idiom? The answer is that siblingship has different connotations in the two tribes. Burridge (1969) emphasizes, above all, the amity that must govern the relationship between senior and junior siblings among the Tangu. If the junior sibling becomes unduly competitive, it is not held against him, but the relationship is redefined so that he becomes a *mwerkindang* – a competitor instead of a subordinate and protégé. The Orokaiva do not permit such a change in status; the younger brother must obey or sever his relations with his family. Moreover, the *apa/eambo* relationship is not confined to the cooperative alliance but includes distant agnates and all uterines within the exogamous group. A good deal of competition and exchange normally occurs between such kin, although the ideology of the *apa/eambo* relationship is basically that of a corporate group pooling resources for the support and protection of its members.

431 437 572 Secondly, the custom of classifying guest friends with siblings is not general among Orokaiva; the Sangara use the term *namei*. Furthermore, terminology is as much an ideological device as a reflection of reality. Use of *apa/eambo* means that people should behave *as if* they were siblings; that is, make free gifts instead of exchange gifts. These terms may be used when one seeks to extract a presentation from a comparative stranger, in which case they mean little more than an appeal *ad misericordiam*. In an hereditary friendship in which it is unusual to make claims, the terms signify that the gifts made to a visiting friend are not repayable but free. Certainly, it would [576] be considered wrong to press claims on the basis of such gifts. On the other hand, the host is expected (*not* merely permitted) to make a return visit, and [626] if he does not present gifts on that occasion, he will certainly be the subject of gossip and loss of reputation.

[558] In considering the manner in which these gifts are given, Sahlins'

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proceeds as though he wished to prove at all costs the absolute interdependence of husband and wife, the absolute necessity of their symbiosis. So important is this ideological notion of symbiosis that the culture has set up numerous imaginary plant symbioses to emphasize it. There is no time here to analyze several other recorded myths which carry the same message.

We may also say that hierarchy is absent on the level of network structure (in the sense of Sperber, 1968) as there is no problem of allocation and no competitive aspect in obligations relating to the giving of coconut and areca. With the exception of mortuary feasts, the nuts are given away in small quantities, as tokens which are part of ordinary social exchange. If a visitor is given no coconut on his arrival in a village, this is rarely because of any absence of coconuts, but mostly because one does not want the visitor to stay, and this unwillingness has nothing to do with the coconut transaction. If there are really no coconuts, this does not affect the relationship. The same applies to areca.

The manner in which coconut and areca are given to guests confirms and expresses the existing social stratification. The most important guest receives the first coconut. He is also likely to receive a large gift of areca, which he then distributes to his followers. Though Orokaiva society is much less stratified than many other New Guinea societies that have been reported, men differ in influence and only the most influential can hold feasts. The position of the "bigger men," as one may call them, is not validated by any ideology or formally designated position, hereditary or otherwise, as is the case in Polynesia.

2. TARO

The foregoing discussion of coconut and areca has been presented because it provides a particularly clear illustration of the nature of code structures and network structures. I would not, however, classify either the code or the networks arising out of coconut and areca exchanges as hierarchical. If we compare these fruits with taro, the principal staple of the Orokaiva,

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we find that taro resembles them in that taro gifts are ritual statements by which attitudes toward social relations are communicated. We may say, to use Mr. Sperber's terminology again, that in this respect they form a code structure. It will be shown that this code structure is again nonhierarchical, thus resembling coconut and areca. On the other hand, a statistical study of the behavior of exchange partners shows that, on the level of exchange structure, there are rules by which a hierarchy is unconsciously generated between households and between villages. A system which combines a hierarchical network with a nonhierarchical code might be described, in my terms, as political, though incompletely so.

Most taro produced by the Orokaiva (over 90% in the villages surveyed) is consumed directly by the producing household. Nonetheless taro is the most ubiquitous of all Orokaiva objects of exchange; most households give some of it away every day. It is also part of the conventional set of gifts that change hands on virtually every ceremonial occasion. The main purpose of such gifts is usually the mediating of social relations rather than the setting up of a claim for a specific return gift. The ritual statements that may be made by means of taro gifts fall into two categories: raw taro, ritually given by men, tends to be part of a ceremony aimed at the establishment or restoration of social relations, whereas gifts of cooked taro, normally made by women, are part of the process of maintaining social relations of a certain degree of intimacy.

I shall base the following abbreviated analysis of taro symbolism on one myth. Of the several versions collected, I shall quote the fullest one, indicating variants where relevant. The name of the principal hero is usually given as Totoima, though this name does not appear in the version quoted. Williams has some references to the Totoima myth (see 1930:155, 158–159, 276), but these are not very illuminating. The following version was obtained from Samuel Jovareka, born at Kiorota and now a resident of Sivepe village:

> A husband slept with his wife. She became pregnant and gave birth to a small child. The husband came and asked:

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either by the housewife who has cooked it or by one of her children. The quantity is usually about two kilograms, which constitutes a very hearty meal for one person. Thus taro gifts become, for the anthropologist, an almost infallible index of intimacy: once two persons have established a certain degree of intimacy, taro exchanges invariably follow. The same cannot be said for any other object of mediation, not even pig meat (which is exchanged only in specific circumstances) or coconut and areca (which may be given to very casual acquaintances). The exchange network of cooked taro therefore coincides with the network of intimate association.

I have made a somewhat detailed, statistically oriented study of taro-exchange networks which, for lack of time, cannot be reported here. During twenty-eight days, between 31 January and 10 March 1967, I recorded taro gifts made by all households of Sivepe village. The number of gifts made and received averaged 2.5 daily per household, ranging from a minimum average of 1.3 to a maximum average of 4.1. At the same time notes were kept of social relations between the households involved: work relations, common journeys, different types of visits between households, conversational groups in various parts of the village. The social interaction records were compared with statistics showing the households to which each household had given taro during the period, and the frequency of those gifts. There was a close correspondence between frequency of taro gifts and intimacy of social relations. There were also a set of types of formal occasions when such gifts were thought especially appropriate, e.g., when the recipient household was entertaining outsiders, had a new baby, a death, had performed some specific service; or if the recipient was old, incapacitated, ill. Nobody made taro gifts to everyone in the village: in the twenty-eight days for which I kept tally, the number of such partnerships varied from three to fourteen out of twenty-two households surveyed, with an average of 8.5.

The taro-exchange partners were always the persons on whom one was most dependent in sentiment, in economic tasks, in political support. They would tend to take one's side in intravillage disputes. Taro gifts thus were a ritual statement in

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which one household would express its desire for close association with another. I inquired to what extent the gifts were balanced. I found, as Sahlins already suggested in 1965, that little importance is attached to precise balance in food gifts. In more than half the households the total imbalance exceeded the proportion 60:40. On the other hand, I also found that extreme imbalance usually has a special explanation, often old age, or special burdens which might be only temporary. Informants, when asked, deny there is any obligation to make return gifts. Yet the statistics show a strong tendency toward the sending of taro gifts on the same day or the day after one has received them. The recipient will explain that he is under no obligation but likes to reciprocate.

Certainly this attitude is in accordance with the explanation I have given of this custom. The return gift should not be considered principally as an obligation but as a ritual statement reciprocating the desire to maintain a close association. Here the question of the frequency of the gifts is closely connected with the question of how intimate each side wants the association to be. An increase in the frequency of the gifts means a desire for a more intimate association. If the recipient wishes to keep the association within certain limits, he may be slow in making a return gift. Unbalanced exchange occurred, for instance, with migrants from a neighboring village (Garombi) who gave more than they received and seemed to be constantly trying to build up new alliances. They were welcomed more warmly by some old residents than by others. If recipients, though fully capable of making equally frequent return gifts, reciprocate halfheartedly, the donor household tends to reduce the gifts to the level acceptable to its partner.

There are, therefore, limits which households set for the extensiveness of their taro-exchange network. These limits are determined less by economic considerations than by sociopolitical ones. There is a limit to the number of intimate social relationships that any individual can maintain. A choice exists, within any culture, between allocating relatively little time to a relatively large number of associates or maintaining a small number of privileged associates with whom contact is very fre-

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quent indeed, while spending relatively less time with the rest. Inevitably a gradation of associations thus develops. This gradation of associations, among the Orokaiva, is expressed by the ritual statement of taro gifts, made with varying frequency. We thus find that the first (i.e., most frequent) partner is involved in an average of 38% of all taro transactions, the second partner in 24%, the third partner in 12%. The first and second partners are in a clearly privileged position.

A second way of describing the pattern of intimacy would be to assume that there is some community norm whereby a certain degree of intimacy is expressed by a specific frequency of gifts. My impression, supported by the statistical facts and some generalizations offered by informants, is that each household has a few preferential partners to whom they give or from whom they receive taro at least twice a week, but often far more frequently. In this sense every household in my sample has at least two preferential partnerships. Nine out of twenty-two had a third, two had a fourth, while the leader of the Seho clan had five.

Topographically it is a general rule that neighboring households form preferential partnerships. As the two clans live in rows on opposite sides of the village, linkages across the village square (*araha*) were thus comparatively sparser than linkages on each side, though some interclan linkages were effected through the households living along the short ends of the quadrangle, these being only weakly linked to either clan but, in a social sense, intermediate between the two.

Two types of hierarchical ordering should be distinguished in this model. The first is the ordering within each clan, where some people are intimate with the sociometric star whereas others are connected with him through being intimate with an intimate. The second type of ordering is close to what graph theorists call a Hamilton circuit (Harari and Ross, 1954; Flament, 1968) and would be consistent with an almost total absence of stratification. For the purpose of a particular transaction with someone outside or inside the village, one often needs the cooperation of a person with whom one is not intimate. This fact is expressed in the model by the size of the total circle and

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the need for several intermediary links to pass from one point to some other points. 824

The Orokaiva are wary of relations with persons with whom they are not intimate. They do not like to make even simple requests of such persons but prefer to make the request through intermediaries who are intimate with both sides. In that case it is possible, if the request cannot be met, for both sides to pretend that it was never made. No hard words are spoken, nobody is overtly humiliated. There is a customary blank, expressionless style which is used by intermediaries for the transmitting of requests—symbolic gestures of neutrality. The mediator avoids the risk of endangering his own alliance while still making what effort he can to satisfy the party seeking the benefit. If he is successful, the beneficiary is to some extent indebted to him. 571 431

This tendency to work through intimates sets up hierarchies in which almost anyone may at some time or other be the star figure. The total network available to an individual through such hierarchies is rather large, as the twenty-two households in my sample, for instance, have easy access to a total of seventy-five villages. Under the ecological conditions of the Orokaiva, no principle of kinship solidarity alone would provide a network of that size.

The basic ritual statement by which the presence of such intimate links is demonstrated is the feminine taro gift. Cooked taro, therefore, mediates not only the exchange of intimate attachment, but also the exchange of access to *alter*'s private network of alliances. The hierarchy of the taro network is based on the intimacy existing between any two consecutive links in the chain. The structure is hierarchical in that at the one end there is a household requiring a benefit, at the other end there is a person able to give that benefit, while the intermediate links are all necessary for the access to that person.

These hierarchies are more complex structures than those arising in the coconut-areca network. The system not only has the "circuit pattern" described above but also is capable of generating at all times new hierarchies linking persons who were not previously linked at all. Whereas the coconut-areca network

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corresponded to restricted exchange, the taro network corresponds to a complex system of generalized exchange. We find both these types of pattern in the Orokaiva marriage system; we find them again in the exchange of objects other than women.

To a large extent, these hierarchies are formed by free choice. Both sides are able to regulate the degree of intimacy by speeding up or slowing down the rate of taro gifts. While thus the taro network offers a good deal of opportunity for subtle *political* manipulation, one crucial criterion is missing from the taro network that is required in a political *system:* conflict is never expressed in terms of taro, except in one case, to which I shall refer below. The fact of not receiving a gift of cooked taro is never, by itself, a *casus belli,* but only a sign of coolness. It may signify no more than a development in a relationship from intimacy to mere amity. It is unlikely to cause anger, unless there are other sources of conflict at the same time.

Male taro gifts, occurring in the context of a feast, should according to the rules not be competitive in quantity. A visiting village expects to receive in return no more and no less than what it has given. If the other side gives more than it has received, this is regarded as an act of hostility. One cannot compare such an act to the potlatch behavior of the Indians or Polynesians, because it is a violation of the Orokaiva rules—a provocation that frequently ends in actual war. On the level of ideology, it is still valid to say that taro gifts can be used, as ritual statements, only to express pseudo-commensality, intimacy, and affection. A quite different rule says that any excessive return gift (whether of taro or something else) serves to express hostility. I shall return to this point elsewhere (Schwimmer, 1974).

CONCLUSION

The purpose of this essay will have been achieved if I have been able to show how objects, in such societies as the Orokaiva one, are "total phenomena," or, perhaps more accurately, multivalent phenomena. Certainly one understands little of the Orokaiva way of life if one does not perceive that a taro, for

435 the latter. Also, migrants normally leave behind a family member
436 with the task of looking after the land (*simbari*) in a technical,
magical and juridical sense. Often he also leaves behind a wife for
167 whom he is saving brideprice but who meanwhile must be looked
after by his relatives. Money sent home therefore covers not only
feasting contributions but also the function of *simbari*. This is
not because village people would not perform such services free
of charge but because, when a man earns money, those who help
him earn that money are entitled to their share.

169 If we look only at the relations of production migrants have in
their jobs, they seem totally 'alienated' (cf. Parkin, this volume).
461 Not only have they no control whatever over the product of their
labour but this product lies entirely outside their conceptual
universe. Yet these migrants avoid proletarianization in the full
[571] sense because they continue to have a stake in the village
environment, which has its own economic, political and ideological
base.

435 Our remarks above apply similarly to the village cash-crop sector.
With the exception of coconuts, the use value Orokaiva see in
European cash-crops is either very limited or non-existent. Coffee
and cocoa are classified as non-foods, rubber latex as an unusable
substance. Even the coconut, though an important food when
fresh, represents no use value to Orokaiva when dried into copra.

This lack of perceived utility has not stopped cultivation of
these crops on village land nor their processing by village-purchased
[245] machinery. Everyone irrespective of age is growing coffee. Those
who are pressed for time tend to give priority to coffee and to
partially replace their plantings of taro with 'German taro' –
less valued but less laborious.[21]

245 Growing coffee is not considered pleasurable like growing taro.
824 When suggesting to an informant that coffee trees have a sweet smell,
I was firmly told: "*We* think the smell is dreadful". Such feelings
461 go to show that the division between the spheres of use value and
exchange value is not purely analytical but corresponds to a con-
ceptual boundary between two models of life and work, and that
Orokaiva try to keep this boundary clear. Coffee is grown because
it takes far less time than it would to grow subsistence crops for
the market, but the grower feels alienated from it while he feels
[438] identified with the subsistence crops. A small quantity of subsistence
crops – surplus to requirements – is in fact sold in local markets
for consumption by local people, but growers take the same care
with them and regard them in the same way as the food they eat.

461 It is paradoxical that the work represented as introduced by Jesus
[179]